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FREE-MARKET FAILURE: THE WELLS FARGO ARBITRATION
CLAUSE EXAMPLE
Jeff Sovern*
ABSTRACT
In September 2016, regulators charged Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A. ('Wells Fargo" or 'Wells') with opening millions of
unauthorized accounts on behalf of its customers. When some of
those customers filed class actions against Wells, the bank
initially responded by moving to compel arbitration on the
ground that the consumers had agreed to arbitrate disputes and
waive their class action rights. Because most customers with
claims in small amounts would probably have foregone filing
an arbitration claim, the effect would have been to leave their
damages uncompensated except for the refunding of fees, which
Wells agreed to in the consent order it entered into with
regulators.
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB" or the
"Bureau') has promulgated a regulation which, if it had been in
effect at the relevant time, would have enabled the injured Wells
customers to obtain class action relief. But Congress blocked the
rule, partly because of free-market economic theory. This Article
argues that free-market economics is not sufficient to protect
consumers from the type of problem present in the Wells Fargo
case for two reasons. First, free-market economics assumes that
consumers have complete information while empirical evidence
shows that consumers do not understand arbitration clauses,
much less that consumers realize that such clauses would bar
class actions as to fraudulent accounts of which the consumers
had no knowledge. Second, the number of primary checking
accounts at Wells consistently increased as the fraud became
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. The author thanks Dee
Pridgen, Adam Levitin, Christine Lazaro, David Horton, Nicole C. Rende, Amanda M.
Schaefer, Kathleen Spellman, and, for inviting him to participate in this symposium, the
editors of Rutgers University Law Review.
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public, suggesting that the free market did not discipline Wells
for its misconduct until regulators intervened, and did so only
modestly at that point. It is even possible that by enforcing
arbitration clauses as written, free-market economics prolonged
the Wells fraud, thus enabling more consumers to be injured.
In short, some device beyond the free market is necessary to
prevent financial institutions from cheating many consumers
out of small amounts. Class actions are one such device, but
arbitration clauses, as currently enforced, enable financial
institutions to prevent their use, thus reducing their incentive to
comply with the law.
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INTRODUCTION
Our country uses four main mechanisms to restrain companies
from misconduct. Three are self-restraint,' the marketplace, 2 and
governmental enforcement of consumer laws. 3 The fourth is lawsuits
from injured consumers, especially in the form of class actions. In
1. For examples where self-restraint has failed, see infra note 119.
2. See infra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 7, 167-70 and accompanying text.
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recent decades, however, many companies have shielded themselves
from class actions and most consumer lawsuits by inserting arbitration
clauses into their contracts with consumers.
The Wells Fargo sham account scandal-one of the most significant
recent consumer frauds involving a financial institution-offers a case
study in the relative effectiveness of these mechanisms. This Article
proceeds as follows: Part I reports on the Wells Fargo scandal. Part II
explores the Consumer Financial Protection. Bureau's arbitration
regulation. Part III discusses the opposition to that regulation based
on free-market economics, while Part IV points out the problems with
free-market economics as applied to arbitration, with particular
reference to the Wells Fargo scandal. In brief, Part IV shows how the
assumptions underlying free-market economics do not apply to
arbitration and that the market did not effectively discipline Wells
when it came to the unauthorized accounts.
I. THE WELLS FARGO SCANDAL
On September 4, 2016, regulators charged Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
with opening as many as two million unauthorized accounts in its
customers' names. 4 To take only one example, the bank reportedly
opened a credit card account for a customer, Aaron Brodie, without his
knowledge. 5 By the time Mr. Brodie learned of the account from debt
collectors, it had accumulated more than $1300 in unpaid fees, which
lowered his credit score, making it difficult for him to obtain a mortgage
and increasing his borrowing expenses.6
In a consent order with the regulators, Wells promised to refund the
fees it had charged customers on the unauthorized accounts and pay
$185 million in fines.7 News of the agreement prompted nationwide
4. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0015 (Sept. 4, 2016), 2016
WL 6646128, http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/092016_cfpbWFBconsent
order.pdf. Wells later estimated the number of unauthorized accounts at 3.5 million.
Emily Glazer, Wells Fargo's Sales-Scandal Tally Grows to Around 3.5 Million Accounts,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 31, 2017, 6:59 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wells-fargos-sales-
scandal-tally-grows-to-around-3-5-million-accounts- 1504184598.
5. Emily Glazer et al., Wells Fargo Is Trying to Fix Its Rogue Account Scandal, One
Grueling Case at a Time, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 27,
2016, 11:24 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wells-fargo-is-trying-to-fix-its-rogue-
account-scandal-one-grueling-case-at-a-time-1482855852.
6. Id.
7. See CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0015, at 14-17; Glazer et al., supra note 5.
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headlines and congressional hearings.8 But, because Mr. Brodie's
account was already in collection, the bank allegedly told him it could
not help him.9 Meanwhile, attorneys responded to stories like Mr.
Brodie's by filing a dozen class action suits on behalf of Wells customers
against the bank to recover damages. 10
Despite clear evidence that customers' signatures had been forged
when sham accounts were opened," and Wells Fargo's
acknowledgments that it had opened unauthorized accounts, 12 Wells
initially responded by moving to compel arbitration on the theory that
8. For samples of news coverage, see supra note 5 and infra note 25. For the
congressional hearings, see An Examination of Wells Fargo's Unauthorized
Accounts and the Regulatory Response: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 114th Cong. (2016), https://www.banking.senate.gov/
public/index.cfm/hearings?ID=B80F9B81-4331-4F95-91BC-718288EC9DAO; Holding Wall
Street Accountable: Investigating Wells Fargo's Opening of Unauthorized Customer
Accounts: Hearing Before the H. Fin. Serus. Comm., 114th Cong. (2016),
http://financialservices.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventlD=401082 [hereinafter
Holding Wall Street Accountable: Hearing].
9. Glazer et al., supra note 5.
10. For an example of a class action complaint against Wells for opening fake
accounts, see Class Action Complaint at 1-3, Mitchell v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No.
2:16-cv-00966-CW (D. Utah Sept. 16, 2016), ECF No. 2. What may have been the earliest
case brought against Wells Fargo for opening unauthorized accounts was filed in 2013,
but was not a class action. See Rebekah Kearn, Man Complains of Forgery at Wells
Fargo, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.courthousenews.com/
man-complains-of-forgery-at-wells-fargo.
11. See Consolidated Amended Complaint Class Action at .13-18, Jabbari v. Wells
Fargo & Co., No. 3:15-cv-02159-VC (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2015), ECF No. 37,
2015 WL 12859455; Michael Hiltzik, How Wells Fargo Exploited a Binding
Arbitration Clause to Deflect Customers' Fraud Allegations, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 26,
2016, 11:55 AM) [hereinafter Hiltzik, How Wells Fargo Exploited a Binding Arbitration
Clause], http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-wells-arbitration-20160926-
snap-story.html. The two signatures below, which appear in the Jabbari complaint,
purport to be from the same Wells customer:
Consolidated Amended Complaint, supra, at 17.
12. See Holding Wall Street Accountable: Hearing, supra note 8 (statement of John G.
Stumpf, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Wells Fargo & Company) ("[A]ccounts
were opened and products were provided to customers that they did not authorize or
want.").
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the cases could not be heard in court or in a class action because the
consumers had agreed to arbitrate the disputes, to waive their class
action rights, and to leave the question of arbitrability to the
arbitrator. 13 The motions succeeded in at least one case. 14
Wells's arbitration clauses were in fact written broadly enough
to cover unauthorized accounts as to existing customers. For
example, one Wells agreement defined a dispute as "any unresolved
disagreement between you and the Bank. It includes any disagreement
relating in any way to the Card or related services, Accounts, or
matters . . . . It includes claims based on broken promises or contracts,
torts, or other wrongful actions."15
When small consumer disputes are diverted to individual
arbitration, the impact is often not only to change the forum in which
the dispute is heard, but also to make it economically unfeasible to
bring the case at all.16 In contrast, claims for smaller amounts that are
heard in court can be resolved, when appropriate, by class actions-a
device that arbitration clauses typically forbid, as was true of the Wells
arbitration clauses.17 As a result, it appeared that the effect of Wells
Fargo's invocation of its arbitration clause would be to block injured
consumers with small claims from obtaining compensation beyond that
provided by the consent decree. Even consumers who brought claims in
arbitration were likely to lose procedural options available in court
litigation, options that might spell the difference between winning and
losing.18 Moreover, research has shown that companies that arbitrate
13. See Wells Fargo Asks Court to Force Customers to Arbitration in Fake Accounts
Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/24/business/
wells-fargo-asks-court-to-force-customers-to-arbitration-in-fake-accounts-cases. html?_r=0.
For an example of such a Wells motion, see Defendants' Notice of Motion & Motion to
Compel Arbitration of Plaintiff Kaylee Heffelfinger's Claims at 7-8, Jabbari, No.
3:15-cv-02159-VC, ECF No. 50, 2015 WL 13544478 (arguing that under the arbitration
agreement, the arbitrator rather than the court was to decide whether the case was to be
resolved through arbitration).
14. See Order Granting Defendants' Motions to Compel Arbitration at 1, Jabbari, No.
3:15-cv-02159-VC, ECF No. 69 (holding that the issue of arbitrability is for the arbitrator
to decide under the agreement). See generally Michael Corkery & Stacy Cowley, Wells
Fargo Moves to Smother Lawsuits over Sham Accounts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2016, at Al.
15. See WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., CONSUMER CREDIT CARD CUSTOMER
AGREEMENT & DISCLOSURE STATEMENT § 31(a), at 5 (2016),
https://www.wellsfargo.com/assets/pdflpersonal/credit-cards/agreements/private-bank_
platinum.pdf.
16. See infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
17. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A, supra note 15, § 31(b), at 9-10. Class actions can also be
heard in arbitration if the parties agree.
18. Such options include the right to appeal and access to discovery devices. See
Michael L. Rustad et al., An Empirical Study of Predispute Mandatory Arbitration
2018] 421
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very often-so-called "extreme repeat players"-have a significant
advantage over consumers.19 In other words, invocation of the Wells
Fargo arbitration clause was likely to have a profound impact on the
ability of injured Wells customers to obtain compensation. Perhaps even
worse, Wells Fargo's use of an arbitration clause might have enabled
Wells to extend its fraud, thereby afflicting more consumers. 20
The Wells Fargo motions generated considerable criticism. 21
Members of Congress proposed legislation to prevent Wells from
shifting the cases to arbitration. 22 Wells may also have feared that the
likelihood of a battle in Congress and the press over the then-
anticipated CFPB regulation barring financial institutions from using
arbitration clauses would further damage the bank's reputation. 23 In
any event, notwithstanding its success in defeating the class actions in
court, on March 28, 2017, Wells reported reaching a $110 million
settlement of the class action claims, 24 which was later raised to $142
Clauses in Social Media Terms of Service Agreements, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV.
643, 663 (2012) ("Mandatory arbitration requires consumers to agree in advance to submit
disputes to a private arbitral provider and divests consumers of important rights that
would otherwise be available, such as their Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial,
discovery, and appeal.").
19. See David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, After the Revolution: An
Empirical Study of Consumer Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57, 119 (2015) (finding that
"extreme repeat-playing companies dominated awarded [arbitration] cases"); Michael
Hiltzik, Here's Why Wells Fargo Forces Its Customers into Arbitration: It Wins Most of the
Time, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2017, 3:10 PM) [hereinafter Hiltzik, Wells Fargo Forces Its
Customers into Arbitration], http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/a-fi-hiltzik-wells-
arbitration-20170407-story.html.
20. See infra notes 111-123 and accompanying text.
21. See Jim Puzzanghera & James Rufus Koren, Senator to Push Bill to Let Wells
Fargo Customers Sue over Unauthorized Accounts, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2016, 6:40 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-wells-fargo-arbitration-20161003-snap-story.html
("We are not going to let corporations like Wells Fargo use these fine-print 'gotchas' to
escape accountability." (quoting presidential candidate Hillary R. Clinton)); Hiltzik, How
Wells Fargo Exploited a Binding Arbitration Clause, supra note 11 ("In the category of
adding insult to injury-or perhaps piling one injury on top of another-Wells Fargo is an
expert."). Wells Fargo's strategy has been referred to as "abusive." Id.
22. Justice for Victims of Fraud Act of 2017, H.R. 1414, 115th Cong. (2017).
23. See Renae Merle, What Wells Fargo Dodged by Agreeing to Pay $110 Million to
Settle Fahe Accounts Case, WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/business/wp2017/03/30/what-wells-fargo-dodged-by-agreeing-to-pay-1 10-million-to-
settle-fake-accounts-case/?utmterm=.ef23c8244610 ("Resolving the suit, legal experts
say, could help keep Wells Fargo, already struggling to repair its imagine [sic] from the
sham accounts scandal, from becoming the center of what many expect to be a contentious
debate next year over the fairness of the arbitration process.").
24. See Dorothy Atkins, Wells Fargo to Pay $110M to End Phony
Accounts Suits, LAW360 (Mar. 28, 2017, 7:31 PM), https://www.1aw360.com/
consumerprotection/articles/907284/wells-fargo-to-pay- 110 m-to-end-phony-accounts-suits
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million, 25 and has since been modified in an attempt to insure that all
injured consumers will be fully compensated for damages. 26 The
settlement is subject to court approval, and while some class members
opposed the settlement,27 the court has granted a motion for
preliminary approval. 28 It may be that Wells still benefited from the
arbitration clauses despite deciding to waive arbitration because,
conceivably, the threat of refusing to waive the clause enabled Wells to
negotiate a more favorable settlement than would otherwise have been
the case.29
In light of Wells Fargo's decision to waive its arbitration clause, it
may be less useful as a case study in examining the impact of
arbitration on consumer protection than it might otherwise have been.
But in any event, it remains highly instructive as a case study with
?nlpk=757d28d3-3e54-41fb-blfl-3bf59ec4el67&utmsource=newsletter&utmmedium
=email&utm-campaign=consumerprotection. Commentators have speculated on Wells
Fargo's motivations in settling rather than relying on its arbitration clauses to defeat
the class action litigation. See Merle, supra note 23 ("[P]ressure on the bank, one
of the largest in the country, has been building. Democratic lawmakers in the
House and Senate have introduced legislation to allow Wells Fargo customers to sue
despite the arbitration clauses .... ).
25. James Rufus Koren, Wells Fargo Ups Sham-Account Settlement to $142 Million,
Making More Customers Eligible, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2017, 12:10 PM), http://
www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-wells-settlement-plan-20170421 -story.html.
26. See James Rufus Koren, Wells Fargo Guarantees Settlement Will Repay
All Customers Hurt by Unauthorized Accounts, L.A. TIMES (June 14, 2017, 11:15 AM),
http://www.1atimes.com/business/la-fi-wells-fargo-guarantee-20170613-story.html. That is
accomplished by providing in an amended settlement agreement for a "gross-up" if
damages exceed a specified amount. See Amended Stipulation & Agreement of Class
Action Settlement & Release at 6, Jabbari v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 3:15-cv-02159-VC
(N.D. Cal. June 14, 2017), ECF No. 162, 2017 WL 3478869; Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of
Amended Settlement Agreement & in Response to Order on Motion for Preliminary
Approval at 4, Jabbari, No. 3:15-cv-20159-VC, ECF No. 160.
27. A number of class members have filed objections to the settlement. See, e.g.,
Objections of Plaintiffs/Class Representatives & Certified Classes in MDL 2036 to
Preliminary Approval of Stipulation & Agreement of Class Action Settlement & Release
at 3, Jabbari, No. 3:15-cv-20159-VC, ECF No. 136; Mitchell Plaintiffs' Objection to
Proposed Settlement Agreement & Motion for Preliminary Approval at 1, Jabbari, No.
3:15-cv-20159-VC, ECF No. 118, 2017 WL 3439006; Alex Chernavsky & William Castro's
Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action
Settlement & for Certification of a Settlement Class; & Renewed Motion to Intervene on
Behalf of Privacy Class at 2, Jabbari, No. 3:15-cv-20159-VC, ECF No. 116.
28. See Order Granting Motion for Preliminary Approval, Denying Motions to
Intervene, Jabbari, No. 3:15-cv-02159-VC, ECF No. 165, 2017 WL 3478868.
29. See Michael Hiltzik, No Surprise: Wells Fargo Is Leveraging Its Arbitration
Clause to Win an Advantageous Scandal Settlement, L.A. TIMES (Mar.
31, 2017, 4:45 PM), http://www.latimes.comlbusiness/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-wells-settlement-
20170331-story.html (arguing that Wells Fargo may have leveraged its ability to force
litigation into arbitration to reduce the size of settlement).
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regard to what happened before Wells entered into the settlement
agreement. Nor is Wells Fargo's decision to waive its arbitration clause
a typical response to the filing of a class action. The considerations that
probably led Wells to do so are rare for consumer financial disputes
subject to arbitration. Congressional committees do not normally hold
hearings devoted to the misconduct of a single financial institution, and
members of Congress do not commonly introduce bills directed at a
single company's misbehavior. Wells did not have a legal obligation
under existing law to forego its class action waivers, and if the
settlement agreement fails to obtain final court approval, Wells might
yet resume its insistence on arbitration. In short, there remain
important lessons about arbitration to learn from the Wells Fargo
cases.
II. THE CFPB's ARBITRATION REGULATION
Arbitration clauses are normally enforceable under the Federal
Arbitration Act.30 But in 2010, Congress authorized the CFPB to
regulate arbitration clauses in consumer financial contracts, provided it
first studied them.31 Any resulting regulation had to be based on
findings "consistent with the study" and "in the public interest and for
the protection of consumers." 32 On March 10, 2015, the Bureau issued
its study, representing the most exhaustive study ever conducted of
consumer arbitration. 33
30. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) ("A written provision in ... a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising
out of such contract or transaction ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.").
Congress has provided that arbitration clauses are not enforceable in certain types of
contracts, such as mortgages issued after June 1, 2013. See 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(e)(1) (2012)
(prohibiting arbitration clauses in residential mortgage loans and open-end credit loans
secured by the consumer's principal dwelling); see also 12 C.F.R. § 1026.36(h) (2017); 36(h)
Prohibition on Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and Waivers of Certain Consumer Rights,
CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/eregulations/sxs/
1026-36-h/2013-0150320130601?fromversion=2014-30405 (last visited May 3, 2018).
31. See 12 U.S.C. § 5518(a)-(b) (2012).
32. Id. § 5518(b).
33. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS,
PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
§ 1028(a) (2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb-arbitration-study-report-
to-congress-2015.pdf [hereinafter CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY]; Field Hearing
on Arbitration in Newark, NJ, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU,
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/events/archive-past-events/field-hearing-on-
arbitration (last updated Jan. 30, 2017).
424
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On May 5, 2016, the CFPB proposed a regulation to bar the use of
class action waivers in arbitration clauses, 34 and on July 10, 2017,
it adopted a final arbitration rule. 35 The Bureau's rule would
permit companies to continue inserting arbitration clauses in their
agreements, but would block arbitration clauses from including class
action waivers.3 6 Had such a rule been in effect in time to apply to the
Wells sham accounts, Wells would not have had the option of shunting
the class action claims off to arbitration.
The CFPB's rule rests in part on the claim-suppressing effect of
class action bans. 37 While consumers could theoretically still assert
individual claims in arbitration, the Bureau study provided empirical
confirmation of Judge Posner's famous observation that "[t]he realistic
alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero
individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30."38 Thus, the
CFPB study found that consumers rarely bring claims for $1000 or less
to arbitration. 39 The study also reported that when arbitration clauses
34. Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32,830 (proposed May 24, 2016) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1040). There was a lag between the Bureau's issuance of its
proposed rule and its publication in the Federal Register.
35. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33,210 (July 19, 2017) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 1040).
36. Id. at 33,428-29. A class action waiver is a term for a provision that waives the
right of a party to participate in a class action.
37. Id. at 33,210 ("This final rule is based on the Bureau's findings-which are
consistent with the Study-that pre-dispute arbitration agreements are being widely used
to prevent consumers from seeking relief from legal violations on a class basis, and that
consumers rarely file individual lawsuits or arbitration cases to obtain such relief.").
Indeed, the blocking of class actions appears to be the reason for the use of arbitration
clauses in consumer contracts. See id. at 33,275; Jeff Sovern, CFPB Arbitration Plan
Provokes Dubious Industry Claims, AM. BANKER (Nov. 13, 2015, 9:30 AM), https://
www.americanbanker.com/opinion/cfpb-arbitration-plan-provokes-dubious-industry-
claims.
38. Carnegie v. Household Int'l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004).
39. CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 33, § 5, at 21, 23-24 (noting that of 1185
disputes in which parties sought monetary relief, only seventy-four involved claims
of $1000 or less); see also Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 19, at 117 ("In the
entire four-and-a-half years covered by our study, only 184 of all 4,839 consumers
in our sample demanded under $1,000."); Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert
Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/Olfbusiness/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-
stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html?action=click&contentCollection=DealBook&module=
RelatedCoverage&region=EndOfArticle&pgtype=article ("[B]y assembling records from
arbitration firms across the country, The Times found that between 2010 and 2014, only
505 consumers went to arbitration over a dispute of $2,500 or less.").
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caused the dismissal of class actions, few of the putative class members
brought individual claims.40
III. OPPOSITION TO THE CFPB'S REGULATION AND FREE-MARKET
EcoNoMICs
The CFPB's initial proposal and final arbitration rule drew
opposition from several quarters. One was congressional Republicans.
Their opposition took multiple forms. On July 25, 2017, the House voted
to rescind the rule, using authority conferred by the Congressional
Review Act. 41 The Senate followed suit on October 24 and President
Trump signed the resolution blocking the rule from taking effect on
November 1, 2017.42 Even before the Bureau had issued the rule, the
House Financial Services Committee had approved on May 4, 2017 the
Financial CHOICE Act,43 authored by the Committee's Chair, Jeb
Hensarling. That bill would eliminate the CFPB's power to regulate
arbitration clauses in consumer financial contracts. 44
Chairman Hensarling's support for the Financial CHOICE Act is
rooted at least in part in his belief in free-market economics. In his
view, "the best consumer protection there is is a competitive, innovative
market with freedom of choice for consumers." 45 During a hearing on
the Wells Fargo scandal, he observed that he believes in markets rather
40. See Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. at 33,276 ("[F]or the 46 class cases
identified in the Study in which a motion to compel arbitration was granted, there
was only an indication of 12 subsequent arbitration filings in the court dockets or
the AAA Case Data, only two of which the Study determined were filed as putative
class arbitrations.").
41. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 801(b)(1), 802(g) (2012). The House vote appears at 163 CONG.
REC. H6278 (daily ed. July 25, 2017).
42. 163 CONG. REC. S6760 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 2017); J. Res. of Nov. 1, 2017, Pub. L.
No. 115-74, 131 Stat. 1243.
43. H.R. 10, 115th Cong. § 737 (2017) (repealing the section authorizing the Bureau to
regulate arbitration clauses); H.R. REP. No. 115-153, pt. 1, at 153, 179 (2017).
44. H.R. 10 § 737. Conceivably, the Bureau could issue a completely different
arbitration rule, notwithstanding the vote under the Congressional Review Act to rescind
the rule it did issue, but if the Financial CHOICE Act were to pass, the CFPB would no
longer have even that power.
45. Brad Wolverton (@bradwolverton), TWITTER (1VIar. 17, 2017, 3:15 PM),
https://twitter.com/bradwolverton/status/842861977047371777 (quoting Rep. Jeb
Hensarling) ("More from my @RepHensarling interview[:] 'I believe that ultimately that
[sic] the best consumer protection there is is a competitive, innovative market with
freedom of choice for consumers. That's what prevents consumers from getting ripped off
with a $50 hamburger-it's called competition."').
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than individual businesses.4 6 Hensarling arrived at his love of free-
market economics while studying economics:
I didn't know why I was a Republican until I studied economics.
I suddenly saw how free-market economics provided the
maximum good to the maximum number, and I became
convinced that if I had an opportunity, I'd like to serve in public
office and further the cause of the free market . . . .47
Free-market economics has considerable appeal, stemming in part
from its view that sellers and buyers who are able to enter into
whatever agreements they want will reach agreements that are
efficient, meaning, among other things, that consumers obtain what
they want at the lowest possible cost.48 The theory assumes that market
participants have perfect information and behave rationally. 49 Suppose
that government obliges sellers to provide a term, such as making it
possible to resolve disputes in class actions. If that term increases
sellers' costs, they will need to raise their prices to recoup the additional
46. Tom Benning, Disappointed Wells Fargo Customer Jeb Hensarling
Grills Bank's Scandal-Ridden CEO, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Sept. 29, 2016),
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/2016/09/29/disappointed-wells-fargo-customer-
jeb-hensarling-grills-banks-scandal-ridden-ceo ("This sordid affair reminds me why I trust
markets but not individual businesses[.]").
47. Joseph Guinto, Jeb Hensarling: The GOP's Most Powerful Nobody, D MAG. (Nov.
2009), http://www.dmagazine.com/publications/d-magazine/2009/november/jeb-hensarling
-the-gops-most-powerful-nobody. For Mr. Hensarling's views on the CFPB specifically, see
Elizabeth Gurdus, House Financial Services Chair: CFPB Is an Unelected 'Dictator' That
Must Be Stopped, CNBC (last updated Feb. 16, 2017, 12:08 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/
2017/02/16/house-financial-services-chair-cfpb-is-an-unelected-dictator-that-must-be-
stopped.html ("[N]o person in America ... should have the power, unilaterally, to decide
what credit cards should go in our wallet, whether or not we can have a mortgage, and
whether or not, if we like our banker, we can keep her[.] . .. [The CFPB] is damaging the
most important consumer protection there is, and that is competitive, innovative,
transparent markets that give Americans the freedom of choice." (third alteration in
original) (quoting Rep. Jeb Hensarling)). But see Credit Card Agreement Database,
CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/credit-cards/
agreements (last visited May 3, 2018) (database of hundreds of credit card issuers' credit
card agreements available to consumers).
48. See JAMES KWAK, ECONOMISM: BAD ECONOMICS AND THE RISE OF INEQUALITY
18-24 (2017) (showing how economic theory predicts prices will equal the marginal cost of
producing the item sold); PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 152
(19th ed. 2010) (same).
49. See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 48, at 164 ("The invisible-hand theory
assumes that buyers and sellers have complete information about the goods and services
they buy and sell.").
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cost.5 0 Put another way, buyers will be obliged to pay a higher cost to
obtain the product. But buyers presumably do not want that term at the
increased cost, or sellers would provide that feature without being
forced to do so by regulation.5 1 Consequently, regulation obliges buyers
to pay more for products because they are obtaining the products with a
feature they value less than it costs. 52 As a result, consumer surplus
declines, and we have a less than optimal equilibrium. 53 Alternatively,
buyers buy less of the items than they would have purchased at the
lower cost, and again we have a less than optimal equilibrium. 54 In
sum, free-marketers believe any deviation from the agreement that
sellers and buyers want to strike, forced by regulation, necessarily
leaves buyers worse off than they would be in the absence of
regulation.55 Consequently, free-market economics argues that
government should generally leave contract terms alone. 56
50. Cf. KWAK, supra note 48, at 132 ("From the standpoint of economism ... financial
regulations simply prevent people from engaging in mutually beneficial transactions
51. For more about the traditional approach of economics to government intervention,
see PAUL KRUGMAN & ROBIN WELLS, ECONOMICS 131-55 (4th ed. 2015).
52. See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 48, at 30 ("[Adam] Smith wrote
hundreds of pages railing against countless cases of government folly and
interference.... Smith argued that such restrictions . . . limit the proper workings of the
market system and ultimately hurt both workers and consumers.").
53. See id. at 96 ("The gap between the total utility of a good and its total market
value is called consumer surplus. The surplus arises because we 'receive more than we
pay for' as a result of the law of diminishing marginal utility."). Put another way,
consumers receive less value for their dollar when providers are subject to government
regulation than when they are not.
54. Another way of thinking of this phenomenon is that the regulation has shifted the
supply curve leftward, which raises prices and so lowers the quantity buyers are willing to
purchase. See generally id. at 55-56 (providing a useful explanation and illustration of a
leftward supply shift).
55. See THOMAS A. DURKIN ET AL., CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY
416 (2014).
Those who take the opposite position frequently argue that competition in the
marketplace protects consumers more effectively than regulation. In this view, if
markets are competitive, then malefactors and unsavory practices ultimately will
lose out to better ones, and governments will not have to make decisions about
how markets should operate or tell consumers what they can and cannot choose
to do. . . . Since strong adherents to this position typically also contend that
markets are quite competitive, they often argue that there is little need for
government intervention beyond basic rules establishing a legal system that
recognizes the validity of contracts between willing parties.
Id.
56. See generally Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts,
and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1208 (2003) ("Economic analysis suggests
that in a perfectly functioning market with complete information contracts between
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Commentators have in fact applied this logic to arbitration
clauses. 57 Stephen J. Ware has explained "businesses using adhesive
arbitration agreements do so because those businesses generally find
that those agreements lower their dispute-resolution costs. . . . [T]his
benefit to businesses is also a benefit to consumers . . . because
whatever lowers costs to businesses tends over time to lower prices to
consumers."58
buyers and sellers will contain only efficient terms, defined as those for which the
differential between benefits and costs is greatest, regardless of how distributed between
buyers and sellers. Economic theory also suggests that substituting an inefficient term
into the contract would make both buyers and sellers worse off. The implication of these
two propositions is that, in the absence of significant negative externalities to third
parties, courts should never refuse to enforce contract terms, even if the terms are
embedded in pre-printed forms and offered on an adhesive basis. To do so would be
socially inefficient, and it would make buyers, as well as sellers, worse off than they
otherwise would be." (footnotes omitted)).
57. See Letter from Nessa Feddis, Vice President & Senior Counsel, Am. Bankers
Ass'n, Steven I. Zeisel, Exec. Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Consumer Bankers Ass'n &
K. Richard Foster, Senior Vice President & Senior Counsel, Fin. Serv. Roundtable, to
Hon. Richard Cordray, Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau 9 (Aug. 22, 2016) (on file with
the Am. Bankers Ass'n), https://www.aba.com/Advocacy/commentletters/Documents/joint-
trades-arbitration-comment-letter.pdf [hereinafter Feddis, Zeisel & Foster Letter] ("The
additional costs associated with the increase in class action lawsuits will result in higher
prices, fewer choices, and lower quality services for consumers as providers pass their
costs onto their customers."); see also Letter from David Hirschmann, President & Chief
Exec. Officer, Ctr. for Capital Mkts. Competitiveness & Lisa Rickard, President, Inst. for
Legal Reform, to Monica Jackson, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau 68-69 (Aug. 22, 2016) (on
file with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/
uploads/sites/1/2016_ 822_ChamberArbitrationCommentLetter.pdf [hereinafter
Hirschmann & Rickard Letter] ("One reason businesses prefer to resolve disputes in
bilateral arbitration is that arbitration offers a less expensive forum for the resolution of
disputes, which lowers businesses' legal costs. This, in turn, leads to cost savings that can
be passed along to consumers.").
58. Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements-with
Particular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 254-55
(2006) (footnote omitted). Ware acknowledged, however, that no empirical evidence
supported his claim, though he also pointed out that at that time, no empirical evidence
undermined his claim either. Id. at 256 n.8. More recently, the CFPB Arbitration Study
refuted Ware's claim. See CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 33, § 10, at 5-6. For
more sources claiming that arbitration clauses or class action waivers reduce costs, see
Amy J. Schmitz, Building Bridges to Remedies for Consumers in International eConflicts,
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 779, 779-80 (2012) ("[C]ompanies often include
arbitration clauses in their contracts to cut dispute resolution costs and produce savings
that they may pass on to consumers through lower prices."); Letter from Dennis Shaul,
Chief Exec. Officer, Cmty. Fin. Serv. Ass'n, to Monica Jackson, Consumer Fin. Prot.
Bureau 4 (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CFPB-2016-0020-
4248 ("[A] ban on class action waivers would increase the legal exposure and legal defense
costs of companies that provide consumer financial products . . . . For some lenders,
absorption of these costs may be unsustainable and lead to an exit from the marketplace,
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This reasoning is seductive. It is, in fact, an illustration of what
James Kwak calls "economism" in his book of the same name: "the
premise that people, companies, and markets behave according to the
abstract, two-dimensional illustrations of an Economics 101 textbook,
even though the assumptions behind those diagrams virtually never
hold true in the real world."5 9 Kwak views "economism" as an ideology
used to justify restraints on regulation. He argues that unrealistic
assumptions create theories that inaccurately describe the results of
policy judgments.60 In fact, when it comes to arbitration clauses,
free-market theories do indeed rest on assumptions at odds with actual
consumer behavior, and like other models that depend on unrealistic
assumptions, they lead to inaccurate conclusions as to the functioning
of the markets. 61 For example, the CFPB Arbitration Study found that
credit card issuers offering contracts with arbitration clauses did not
raise prices after eliminating arbitration clauses; thus contradicting the
theory that arbitration clauses reduce prices. 62 The next section more
fully explores whether the assumptions undergirding free-market
economics hold true when applied to arbitration clauses, as well as how
the market responded to the Wells Fargo account scandal.
resulting in fewer choices for consumers."). Courts have also made similar comments
about forum selection clauses, which are somewhat similar to arbitration clauses. See
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 594 (1991) ("[I]t stands to reason that
passengers who purchase tickets containing a forum clause like that at issue in this case
benefit in the form of reduced fares reflecting the savings that the cruise line enjoys by
limiting the fora in which it may be sued."); IFC Credit Corp. v. United Bus. & Indus. Fed.
Credit Union, 512 F.3d 989, 993 (7th Cir. 2008) (analogizing to arbitration clauses: "[a]s
long as the market is competitive, sellers must adopt terms that buyers find acceptable;
onerous terms just lead to lower prices").
59. KWAK, supra note 48, at 6-7.
60. Id.
61. Among the many examples Kwak provides is one that seems analogous to
arbitration clauses. Here is his description of the toxic mortgages that led to the
foreclosure crisis and the Great Recession in turn:
The fact that ordinary human beings could not understand the legal documents
they were signing was a crucial feature of the entire [mortgage] system, not a
bug. According to economism, an unregulated mortgage market will maximize the
number of value-creating transactions between buyers and suppliers of credit.
Instead, the lack of regulation made it possible for millions of borrowers-aided
and abetted by mortgage brokers and lenders-to take out loans they had little
chance of repaying.
Id. at 145. Similarly, consumers seem unable to understand arbitration clauses, as
discussed infra note 63 and accompanying text.
62. See CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 33, § 10, at 5-6.
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IV. THE PROBLEMS WITH APPLYING FREE-MARKET ECONOMICS TO
ARBITRATION CLAUSES AND THE WELLS FARGO SCANDAL
A. The Assumptions Underlying Free-Market Economics Do Not Apply
to Arbitration Clauses
When it comes to arbitration clauses, the assumptions that
consumers have perfect information and are rational seem particularly
in question. In combination, these assumptions lead free-market
economists to believe that consumers will make decisions in accordance
with their own best interests and preferences. If that were so, then
departures from the deals sellers and buyers strike would indeed
yield the inefficiencies free-market economists warn against. But
consumers often do not have perfect information and are not always
rational, with the result that the agreement consumers and sellers
enter may in fact not be optimal.
Two recent studies bear on the question of whether consumers have,
or even can have, perfect information about arbitration clauses.63
Though the studies used different methodologies, they both raise
serious doubt about the extent to which consumers understand
arbitration clauses. Obviously, if consumers do not understand
arbitration clauses, the assumptions underlying free-market economics
are inapplicable to them.
One of the studies, Whimsy Little Contracts, which I co-authored,
surveyed 668 consumers online. We showed the respondents a contract
with an arbitration clause printed in bold and italics. Key parts were
also in ALLCAPS, including a section that said they could not
participate as a representative or member of a class. 64 Then we asked
them questions about the arbitration clause, including two questions
63. See Jeff Sovern, Elayne E. Greenberg, Paul F. Kirgis & Yuxiang Liu, "Whimsy
Little Contracts" with Unexpected Consequences: An Empirical Analysis of Consumer
Understanding of Arbitration Agreements, 75 MD. L. REV. 1, 2 (2015) [hereinafter Whimsy
Little Contracts]. The research reported in the article "was supported by a $29,510 grant
from the American Association for Justice Robert L. Habush Endowment and by a grant
from the St. John's University School of Law Hugh L. Carey Center for Dispute
Resolution." Id. at 1; see also CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 33, § 1, at 2.
64. See Whimsy Little Contracts, supra note 63, at 90 ("YOU WILL NOT HAVE THE
RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE AS A REPRESENTATIVE OR MEMBER OF ANY
CLASS OF CLAIMANTS, OR AS A PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
PERTAINING TO ANY CLAIM SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION."). In addition, the
first page of text in the contract (the second overall) said, again in bold: "This agreement
contains an arbitration provision (including a class action arbitration waiver).
It is important that you read the entire Arbitration Provision section carefully."
Id. at 86.
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about class actions. Despite the contract provision providing that
consumers could not participate in class actions arising out of the credit
card agreement, four times as many respondents thought they could be
in a class action as realized that they could not. 65 Only 12% recognized
that the arbitration clause blocked them from being included in a class
action, while 48% believed it did not.6 6
The Whimsy Little Contracts study also attempted to determine
whether respondents understood that class action waivers are
enforceable. Another question described a scenario, concluding:
"Suppose the contract said you could not join with other consumers to
bring a class action. Could you be included in a class action against the
credit card company, either in court or arbitration or both?"67 Less than
a third of the respondents correctly replied that they could not be. 68 As
one respondent put it, "I don't see how they could preclude us from
filing a class action suit through a whimsy little contract." 69 The United
States Supreme Court does. 70
When the answers to the two survey questions were read in
conjunction, they raised even more troublesome questions about the
ability of consumers to understand the impact of arbitration clauses
containing class action waivers. Only 6% of the respondents answered
both questions in the negative, while more than a fourth wrongly gave
positive answers to both questions.7 1 In other words, more than four
times as many respondents believed a contract with a class action
waiver did not include an arbitration clause-or, if it did, wrongly
thought that clause was unenforceable-as those who recognized a class
action waiver and knew'it was enforceable.
The performance of the Whimsy Little Contracts respondents on
class action questions was not an aberration. Overall, the study raises
concerns both about whether consumers correctly interpret arbitration
clauses and whether they appreciate that they are enforceable.
Respondents entered more than five thousand answers to the
65. Id. at 51-52.
66. Id. at 52.
67. Id. at 54.
68. Id. Specifically, 36.5% answered "yes"; 28.9% clicked "no"; and 34.6% selected "I
don't know." Id. Though the differences between "yes" answers and "no" answers were
within the survey's margin of error, more than twice as many respondents chose either
"yes" or "I don't know" as correctly replied "no." Id.
69. Id. at 55.
70. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 340, 352 (2011) (holding that
states cannot categorically invalidate class action waivers in arbitration clauses as
unconscionable).
71. Whimsy Little Contracts, supra note 63, at 55.
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eight questions that had correct and incorrect answers-but only a
quarter of their answers were right.72 While less than 1% selected
correct answers to all eight questions, nearly a fifth did not choose any
correct answers. 73
The second survey of consumers' understanding and awareness of
arbitration clause was conducted by the CFPB as part of its massive
study of arbitration.7 4 The Bureau asked consumers about their actual
credit card contracts and then examined those contracts to determine if
the respondents correctly understood their credit card terms. Though
the Bureau's study employed a different methodology from the Whimsy
Little Contracts study, to the extent that its survey addressed the same
issues as the Whimsy Little Contracts survey, its results were similar.
For example, the Bureau study found that 56.7% of the respondents
whose credit card contracts included class action waivers nevertheless
believed they could participate in class actions.75 The Bureau also
reported that less than 7% percent of its respondents whose contracts
included arbitration clauses realized that they could not sue the credit
card issuer in court-which was statistically similar to the proportion of
respondents whose credit card contracts lacked arbitration clauses who
believed they could not sue their credit card company in court.76
The Bureau's study also found that consumers generally did not
take into account dispute resolution terms when deciding which credit
card to seek.77 Similarly, the Whimsy Little Contracts survey found that
72. Id. at 64.
73. Id.
74. CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 33, § 3.
75. Id. § 3, at 4. The 8% difference between the Whimsy Little Contracts respondents
and the CFPB study respondents may owe something to the fact that the Bureau's
respondents were asked to remember a credit card contract they might not have reviewed
in some time (or ever) while the Whimsy Little Contracts respondents had been shown the
contract immediately before answering the questions.
76. CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 33, § 3, at 4 (adding that 7.7% of
respondents without arbitration clauses believed they could not sue their credit card
issuer in court). Similarly, only 14% of the Whimsy Little Contracts respondents realized
that the contract they saw would block them from suing in court. Whimsy Little Contracts,
supra note 63, at 46.
77. CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 33, § 3, at 3.
When asked an open-ended question regarding all the features that factored into
their decision to get the credit card that they use most often for personal use, no
consumers volunteered an answer that even implicitly referenced dispute
resolution procedures . ...
When presented with a list of nine features of credit cards (e.g., interest
rates, customer service, rewards) and asked to identify those features that
factored into their decision, consumers identified dispute resolution procedures as
being relevant less often than any of the other eight options.
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the arbitration clause was salient to few respondents. In response to an
open-ended question asking respondents to list five items they recalled
from the credit card contract, only 3% of the respondents mentioned
the arbitration clause, despite the fact that it appeared in bold print
and italics, with portions in ALLCAPS. 78 Two other items that
respondents remembered at least as frequently did not appear in
bold, italics, or ALLCAPS.79
To the extent that the free market requires rational actors with
perfect information, it is difficult to see how it will function on behalf of
consumers who typically overlook class action waivers and, when they
do become aware of them, often assume that the waivers are
unenforceable.8 0 If consumers cannot determine which contracts include
arbitration clauses and which do not, they will be unable to tell which
companies use such clauses and so cannot effectively try to avoid
companies which do, if they want to do so. Moreover, consumers who
believe that arbitration clauses do not bar them from joining a class
action or suing in court have little reason to avoid contracts with
arbitration clauses. That may help explain why the Wells Fargo
customers agreed to a term that enabled Wells to defraud them and
leave them without any effective means of redress. If consumers
cannot understand arbitration clauses, we surely cannot expect them
to anticipate that the clauses protect banks that open sham accounts
in their names.8 1
Id.
78. Whimsy Little Contracts, supra note 63, at 40-41.
79. Id. at 41.
80. According to one economic theory, markets can achieve efficient results even when
some consumers are unable to act in their best interests or uninterested in doing so as
long as a large enough critical mass of other consumers exists that merchants want to
meet the needs of that critical mass and can't distinguish between them and less informed
consumers. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of
Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 638, 663
(1979). But, as noted in Whimsy Little Contracts, the theory seems inapplicable to
arbitration clauses in general and class action waivers in particular, in part because it is
unlikely that the requisite critical mass of awareness and understanding exists for
arbitration clauses. See Whimsy Little Contracts, supra note 63, at 74-76.
81. See Declaration of Kaylee Heffelfinger in Support of Plaintiffs' Opposition to
Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration para. 9, at 2, Jabbari v. Wells Fargo & Co., No.
3:15-cv-02159-VC (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2015), ECF No. 54-5 ("When I opened my original
accounts with Wells Fargo and enrolled in online banking with Wells Fargo, I did not
intend to agree to give up my right to sue Wells Fargo for opening up accounts that I did
not know about and that were not related to my original accounts.").
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B. The Market Did Not Discipline Wells Fargo Effectively for the
Unauthorized Accounts
Free-market advocates argue that the market disciplines bad actors
by depriving them of customers and ultimately putting them out of
business. 82 Consequently, it is useful to examine how consumers have
responded to Wells for opening the unauthorized accounts.
That task is complicated by uncertainty concerning the timing of
the fraud, as might be expected of a fraud carried on without official
sanction by employees responding to incentives created by their
employer. The consent decree refers to the period from 2011 to 2015,
implying that this was when employees were opening the unauthorized
accounts, 83 though some fraudulent accounts were opened nearly a
decade earlier.84 In January 2010, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency discussed with senior bank management 700 whistleblower
complaints it had received concerning the fraud. 85The fraud first drew
media attention in 2013 when the Los Angeles Times reported that
Wells employees were opening unauthorized accounts for customers.8 6
82. See E. Scott Reckard, Lawsuits Put Heat on Wells Fargo, but Investors Barely
Notice, L.A. TIMES (May 14, 2015, 6:12 PM), http://www.latimes.comlbusiness/la-fi-wells-
fargo-class-action-201505 15-story.html (quoting Susquehanna Financial Group's analyst
Jack Micenko as to the Wells scandal that "the free-market system suggests clients would
leave if they were uncomfortable").
83. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0015 (Sept. 4, 2016), 2016
WL 6646128, http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/092016_cfpbWFBconsent
order.pdf; see also Paul Blake, Timeline of the Wells Fargo Accounts Scandal, ABC NEWS
(Nov. 3, 2016, 4:15 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/timeline-wells-fargo-accounts-
scandal/story?id=42231128.
84. See, e.g., INDEP. DIRS. OF THE BD. OF WELLS FARGO & Co., SALES PRACTICES
INVESTIGATION REPORT 31, 73 (2017), https://www08.wellsfargomedia.com/assets/pdfl
aboutlinvestor-relations/presentations/2017fboard-report.pdf (reporting that Wells Fargo's
Internal Investigation found an increase in annual sales gaming cases from 2000 to 2004
and that it also disclosed employees in the Colorado branch issuing unauthorized debit
cards in 2002); Stacy Cowley, At Wells Fargo, Complaints About Fraudulent Accounts
Since 2005, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/12/business/
dealbook/at-wells-fargo-complaints-about-fraudulent-accounts-since-2005.html.
85. See OFFICE OF ENTER. GOVERNANCE & THE OMBUDSMAN, OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ENTERPRISE GOVERNANCE SUPERVISION: LESSONS
LEARNED REVIEW OF SUPERVISION OF SALES PRACTICES AT WELLS FARGO 5 (2017)
[hereinafter OCC, ENTERPRISE GOVERNANCE SUPERVISION].
86. See E. Scott Reckard, Wells Fargo's Pressure-Cooker Sales Culture Comes at a
Cost, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-wells-
fargo-sale-pressure-20131222-story.html [hereinafter Wells Fargo's Pressure-Cooker]
("[E]mployees have opened unneeded accounts for customers, ordered credit cards without
customers' permission and forged client signatures on paperwork."); E. Scott Reckard,
Wells Fargo Fires Workers Accused of Cheating on Sales Goals, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2013),
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/oct/03/business/la-fi-mo-wells-fargo-workers-fired-
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That was also the year that the CFPB received its first whistleblower
tip on the matter 87 and in which former Wells CEO John Stumpf later
testified that he learned of the fraud. 88 While 2015 may be a plausible
ending date for the scandal, as it was the year in which both the Los
Angeles City Attorney suit and the first class action were filed,89 a
consultant Wells engaged reported allegations of employee-related sales
misconduct continuing into the first quarter of 2016.90
Whatever dates for the fraud are chosen, it appears the
marketplace did little, if anything, to discipline Wells for its misconduct
20131003 [hereinafter Wells Fargo Fires Workers] ("Wells Fargo & Co. has fired about 30
branch employees in the Los Angeles region who the bank said had opened accounts that
were never used . . . . One of the fired employees said that in some cases signatures were
forged and customers had accounts opened in their names without their knowledge."); see
also INDEP. DIRs. OF THE BD. OF WELLS FARGO & Co., supra note 84, at 26 (noting that the
fraud "first came to public attention" through the L.A. Times articles); Brian Tayan, The
Wells Fargo Cross-Selling Scandal 2 (Stanford Univ. Graduate Sch. of Bus., Research
Paper No. 17-1, Dec. 2, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=2879102 (follow "Download this Paper" hyperlink) ("In 2013,
rumors circulated that Wells Fargo employees in Southern California were engaging in
aggressive tactics to meet their daily cross-selling targets.").
87. See Richard Cordray, Prepared Opening Statement of CFPB Director Richard
Cordray Before the House Committee on Financial Services, CONSUMER
FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/
newsroom/prepared-opening-statement-cfpb-director-richard-cordray-house-committee-
financial-services; Brena Swanson, Cordray Answers Charges that CFPB Didn't Take
Lead on Wells Fargo Scandal, HOUSING WIRE (Apr. 5, 2017), https://
www.housingwire.com/articles/39782-cordray-answers-charges-that-cfpb-didnt-take-lead-
on-wells-fargo-scandal (reporting that CFPB Director Richard Cordray testified in
Congress that the CFPB first received a whistleblower tip about the Wells unauthorized
accounts in 2013).
88. See Ashlee Kieler, Wells Fargo CEO Stumpf Admits He Learned of Fake Accounts
in 2013, CONSUMERIST (Sept. 30, 2016), https://consumerist.com/2016/09/20/wells-fargo-
ceo-stumpf-admits-he-learned-of-fake-accounts-in-2013; see also INDEP. DIRS. OF THE BD.
OF WELLS FARGO & Co., supra note 84, at 55 (describing how Stumpf was notified of one
incident in 2002 and received numerous customer and employee complaints which "he or
his assistants referred to appropriate subordinates without further follow-up. According
to Wells Fargo employees, concerns about sales practices and 'gaming' were raised with
Stumpf during the 2012-2014 timeframe."). While the Independent Directors' report
indicated that the Wells board first heard of the problem in 2014, id. at 67, a court opinion
put it at 2013. See Shaev v. Baker, No. 16-cv-05541-JST, 2017 WL 1735573, at *5 (N.D.
Cal. May 4, 2017).
89. See Complaint for Equitable Relief and Civil Penalties, California v. Wells Fargo
& Co., No. BC580778 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed May 4, 2015), http://freepdfhosting.com/
c7384fa6fc.pdf. In 2015, the Jabbari complaint was also filed. Complaint at 1, Jabbari v.
Wells Fargo & Co., No. 3:15-cv-02159-VC (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2015), ECF No. 1. Both
filings drew media attention, albeit without immediately lowering Wells's stock price. See
Reckard, supra note 82 (indicating that Wells shares gained the day after the filing of the
class action, which occurred the week after the City Attorney's filing).
90. See INDEP. DIRS. OF THE BD. OF WELLS FARGO & CO., supra note 84, at 33-34.
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before regulators stepped in. For example, Wells experienced more than
twice as much growth in average deposits from 2014 to 2015 as did
competitors like Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, and Citigroup. 91
One measure of market response is the number of active checking
accounts: existing customers could punish banks by closing checking
accounts while non-customers might open accounts elsewhere. Yet, as
Figure 192 shows, in every quarter since the beginning of 2013-the
year in which the scandal first became public-the number of primary
checking accounts at Wells increased by at least 2.1% over the same
quarter in the preceding year. In the first quarter of 2014-the first
full quarter after the Los Angeles Times reported that Wells employees
were opening unauthorized accounts-the number of checking accounts
rose by 5.1% over the previous year. In each of the ten succeeding
quarters, the number increased by at least 4.6%. In short, there
is little reason to think the market would have put a stop to Wells
Fargo's fraud if Wells itself or regulators had not done so. But belief
in the free market as a check on misconduct persisted. After the filing
of at least one class action and the Los Angeles City Attorney's suit
in 2015, a stock analyst explained "the free-market system suggests
clients would leave if they were uncomfortable . . . and we have
certainly not seen that with Wells." 93
91. Tayan, supra note 86, at 7 (reporting that Wells's growth was 7%, Bank of
America's 3%, and JPMorgan's 2%, while Citigroup lost 5%; PNC and US Bank
experienced slightly larger growth at 8%).
92. See infra Figure 1.
93. Reckard, supra note 82 (quoting Susquehanna Financial Group's analyst Jack
Micenko).
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Customers Increase from Previous Year94
2016: Quarter 4: 3.5%95
Quarter 3: 4.7%96
94. Wells defines "primary consumer checking customers" as "[c]ustomers who
actively use their checking account with transactions such as debit card purchases, online
bill payments, and direct deposit." Press Release, Wells Fargo, Wells Fargo Reports $5.3
Billion in Quarterly Net Income 8 & n.5 (Jan. 13, 2017), https://newsroom.wf.com/press-
release/corporate-and-financial/wells-fargo-reports-53-billion-quarterly-net-income.
95. Id. at 8.
96. Press Release, Wells Fargo, Wells Fargo Reports $5.6 Billion in Quarterly Net
Income 8 (Oct. 14, 2016), https://newsroom.wf.com/press-release/corporate-and-financial/
wells-fargo-reports-56-billion-quarterly-net-income.
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Figure 1: Wells Fargo's Primary Consumer Checking
Wells Fargo Primary Consumer Checking Customers Increase From Previous Year
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2013: Quarter 4: 4.7%107
97. Press Release, Wells Fargo, Wells Fargo Reports $5.6 Billion in Quarterly Net
Income 8 (July 15, 2016), https://newsroom.wf.com/press-release/corporate-and-financiall
wells-fargo-reports-56-billion-quarterly-net-income-0.
98. Press Release, Wells Fargo, Wells Fargo Reports $5.5 Billion in Quarterly Net
Income 7 (Apr. 13, 2016), https://newsroom.wf.com/press-release/corporate-and-financiall
wells-fargo-reports-55-billion-quarterly-net-income.
99. Press Release, Wells Fargo, Wells Fargo Reports $5.7 Billion in Quarterly Net
Income 8 (Jan. 15, 2016), https://newsroom.wf.com/press-release/corporate-and-financiall
wells-fargo-reports-57-billion-quarterly-net-income-diluted.
100. Press Release, Wells Fargo, Wells Fargo Reports $5.8 Billion in Quarterly Net
Income 8 (Oct. 14, 2015), https://newsroom.wf.com/press-release/corporate-and-financial/
wells-fargo-reports-58-billion-net-income.
101. Press Release, Wells Fargo, Wells Fargo Reports $5.7 Billion in Quarterly Net
Income 8 (July 14, 2015), https://newsroom.wf.com/press-release/corporate-and-financiall
wells-fargo-reports-57-billion-net-income.
102. Press Release, Wells Fargo, Wells Fargo Reports $5.8 Billion in Quarterly Net
Income 9 (Apr. 15, 2015), https://newsroom.wf.com/press-release/corporate-and-financiall
wells-fargo-reports-57-billion-net-income.
103. Press Release, Wells Fargo, Wells Fargo Reports Record Full Year Net Income 9
(Jan. 14, 2015), https://newsroom.wf.com/press-release/corporate-and-financial/wells-
fargo-reports-record-full-year-net-income.
104. Press Release, Wells Fargo, Wells Fargo Reports $5.7 Billion in Quarterly Net
Income 9 (Oct. 14, 2014), https://newsroom.wf.com/press-release/corporate-and-financial/
wells-fargo-reports-57-billion-net-income-0.
105. Press Release, Wells Fargo, Wells Fargo Reports $5.7 Billion in Quarterly Net
Income 9 (July 11, 2014), https://newsroom.wf.com/press-release/corporate-and-financiall
wells-fargo-reports-57-billion-net-income- 1.
106. Press Release, Wells Fargo, Wells Fargo Reports Record Quarterly Net Income 9
(Apr. 11, 2014), https://newsroom.wf.com/press-release/corporate-and-fmanciallwells-
fargo-reports-record-quarterly-net-income.
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Not only did the market fail to penalize Wells for its misconduct,
but some have charged it might actually have lengthened the period in
which Wells continued its fraud by allowing Wells to rely on its
arbitration clause.111 An arbitration clause might have such an impact
for a variety of reasons. For example, had a class action proceeded,
adverse court orders might have prompted Wells to alter its practices
more quickly to reduce possible damages. Of course, as with any
counterfactual, it is impossible to know, but in other cases, banks, and
indeed Wells itself, have reacted to orders in a class action in one state
by abandoning the challenged practices in other states whose citizens
were not part of the class. Thus, after a court ruled that Wells had
unlawfully reordered checks in a California class action, Wells changed
its practices in other jurisdictions not subject to the court's ruling. 1 12
Conceivably, even a realistic threat of a class action might have caused
Wells to move more quickly. Class actions are thought to deter
misconduct 113 by changing the incentives a company faces when
107. Press Release, Wells Fargo, Wells Fargo Reports Record Full Year and Quarterly
Net Income 9 (Jan. 14, 2014), https://newsroom.wf.com/press-release/corporate-and-
financiallwells-fargo-reports-record-full-year-and-quarterly-net.
108. Press Release, Wells Fargo, Wells Fargo Reports Record Quarterly Net Income 9
(Oct. 11, 2013), https://newsroom.wf.com/press-release/corporate-and-financial/wells-
fargo-reports-record-quarterly-net-income-0.
109. Press Release, Wells Fargo, Wells Fargo Reports Record Quarterly Net Income 9
(July 12, 2013), https://newsroom.wf.com/press-release/corporate-and-financial/wells-
fargo-reports-record-quarterly-net-income-1.
110. Press Release, Wells Fargo, Wells Fargo Reports Record Quarterly Net Income
(Apr. 12, 2013), https://newsroom.wf.com/press-release/corporate-and-financial/wells-
fargo-reports-record-quarterly-net-income-2.
111. See Hiltzik, How Wells Fargo Exploited a Binding Arbitration Clause, supra note
11; Robert Weissman & Lisa Donner, Why Wells Fargo Got Away with It for So Long, THE
HILL (Sept. 20, 2016, 10:15 A1VI), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/finance/296706-
why-wells-fargo-got-away-with-it-for-so-long; see also Hiltzik, Wells Fargo Forces Its
Customers into Arbitration, supra note 19 ("The absence of a public record may have
allowed the Wells Fargo scandal to persist for years out of public view.").
112. See Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32,830, 32,858 (proposed May 24, 2016)
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1040) (describing Wells Fargo's reaction to the court
decision in Gutierrez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 730 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1082 (N.D. Cal.
2010), affd in pertinent part, 704 F.3d 712, 725-28 (9th Cir. 2012)).
113. See id. at 32,861-64 ("[D]eterrence is one of the primary objectives of class
actions."); see also Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (1979) (discussing how
class actions deter violations of the law).
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contemplating bad conduct. But the arbitration clause eliminated the
possibility of adverse court orders, unless Wells agreed to submit to a
class action.
Another, albeit less persuasive, reason a class action might have
caused Wells to end its misconduct earlier is rooted in the contrast
between the public nature of court proceedings and the private nature
of arbitration proceedings. 114 An arbitration-possibly even including a
trial-probably draws less publicity than proceedings in open court. In
theory, the marketplace not only failed to penalize Wells Fargo's
misconduct, but by reducing its perfidy's profile may even have made
it less likely that consumers would become aware of that perfidy,
ironically insulating Wells from the scrutiny of the marketplace that
free-marketers claim disciplines wayward businesses.
Whether that aspect of arbitration really made a difference is
debatable in the Wells case. On the one hand, the bank's agreement to
waive its arbitration clause suggests that Wells was sensitive to the
public criticism it endured and would likewise have been sensitive to
adverse publicity from, say, a trial. But the market seemed less
sensitive. The filing of the Jabbari class action and the Los Angeles
City Attorney's lawsuit against Wells, both in May 2015, were followed
by a 5.8% increase in deposits the following quarter.11 5 Whether the
Jabbari class action would have had more of an impact on the market if
the Wells motion to compel arbitration had not been granted and the
class action had been allowed to proceed is an unanswerable question.
Even after regulators trumpeted Wells Fargo's misconduct in the
September 2016 consent order, eliciting nationwide media attention
and congressional hearings, the market seems to have punished Wells
only modestly. In the first full quarter after the consent order, checking
accounts at Wells increased by 3.5% over the same quarter in the
preceding year.116 That figure is lower than in any quarter since 2013,
but it still shows an increase, demonstrating that many consumers are
willing to bank at Wells, notwithstanding the fraud.
114. See Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 32,844 (noting that court proceedings
are usually public while arbitration is private). For another example of a company
allegedly using arbitration clauses to conceal misconduct, see Drew Harwell, Sterling
Discrimination Case Highlights Differences Between Arbitration, Litigation, WASH. POST
(Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/sterling-
discrimination-case-highlights-differences-between-arbitration-litigation/2017/03/01/
cdcc08c6-fe9b-11e6-8f41-ea6ed597e4ca-story.html?utmterm=.a671 lfa8lcel.
115. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. The Jabbari class action complaint
was filed on May 13, 2015. Complaint at 1, Jabbari v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 3:15-cv-
02159-VC (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2015), ECF No. 1, 2015 WL 3485066.
116. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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Of course, other measures of consumer engagement exist. Brian
Tayan has reported that customer visits to branches, credit card
applications, and debit card applications all fell after the consent
order was announced. 117 According to the Los Angeles Times in March
2017: "New checking account openings are running an average of
40% behind the same months a year earlier, and new credit card
accounts are down by almost 50%. It isn't entirely clear whether the
comparisons are so bad because the year-ago period includes bogus
accounts."1 18
But it appears that Wells is doing far better than a failing bank
would, despite its fraud, and was doing so before it settled the class
actions. And during the period between the reporting of the fraud and
the announcement of the consent order, Wells did not show ill effects
from the scandal.
Markets can also work through creating incentives. Those
incentives encourage the supplying of consumers with items they want
at appropriate prices, but they can also create incentives to generate
profits by creating the illusion that consumers are receiving something
of value. 119 Banks can increase revenue by serving more of their
117. See Tayan, supra note 86, at 4 ("The long-term impact on the bank was unclear.
Customer visits to branches declined 10 percent year-over-year in the month following the
scandal. Credit card and debit card applications also fell. Deposits and new checking
accounts, however, continued to grow-albeit at below-historical rates."); see also Jen
Wieczner, Here's How Much Wells Fargo's Fake Accounts Scandal Is Hurting the Bank,
FORTUNE (Jan. 13, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/01/13/wells-fargo-fake-accounts-
scandal-closing-branches-earnings ("In Wells Fargo's community banking unit-the retail
division in which the scandal took place-quarterly revenues declined 5% while profits
sank 14% compared to the same period in 2015. While the bank's new CEO Tim Sloan
said the impact of the scandal itself on Wells Fargo's revenue 'has not been significant,' he
acknowledged that if the slowdown in customer account growth were to continue at
the current rate, 'that would have a bigger impact."'). And note that a decline in profits
does not mean a loss.
118. Michael Hiltzik, Customers Still Seem Wary of Doing Business with Wells
Fargo-with Good Reason, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2017, 3:50 PM), http://www.latimes.com/
business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-wells-struggle-20170321-story.html; see also Wells Fargo
Customers Continue to Shy Away from the Bank amid Fallout from Its Accounts Scandal,
L.A. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2017, 3:35 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-wells-account-
slowdown-20170320-story.html ("[T]here is a silver lining for the bank: Its February
numbers are up from December lows.").
119. See Jeff Sovern, The Risks of Unfettered Capitalism, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/16/business/dealbook/the-risks-of-unfettered-
capitalism.html ("Capitalism may be the best economic system ever devised, but one of its
drawbacks is that it provides financial incentives to harm and even kill people. Just ask
those people who say they have been victimized by cigarettes, predatory lenders,
Volkswagen diesel emissions, Takata airbags, General Motors ignition switches, Trump
University, Vioxx, asbestos. . . .").
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customers' banking needs, and so during the years before its
misconduct came to light, Wells Fargo created incentives for Wells
employees to "cross-sell"; that is, to persuade existing customers to open
additional accounts. 120 As then-CEO John Stumpf wrote, Wells "fight[s]
like cats and dogs for those numbers!" 121 Some Wells employees
responded to these incentives by fraudulently opening unauthorized
accounts. 122 This enabled Wells to boast of its cross-selling success,
which probably boosted stock prices. 123 But it also eventually led to the
scandal.
In sum, if the world posited by free-market economics were realistic,
we would expect that the market would create disincentives to behave
the way Wells did. But the market seems not to have done that, at
least not until regulators became involved. In fact, Wells Fargo's
use of arbitration clauses, sanctioned by the market, may have
prolonged its fraud. If the extraordinary attention given to the Wells
fraud-nationwide media attention, regulatory intervention,
congressional hearings, and proposed legislation-elicited such a
120. See Emily Glazer, At Wells Fargo, How Far Did Bank's Sales Culture Go?, WALL
ST. J. (Nov. 30, 2015, 5:34 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/at-wells-fargo-how-far-did-
banks-sales-culture-go-1448879643 ("In 1999, the bank said its customers on
average used three of its products or services-the bank calls them 'solutions'-and hoped
to increase that number to eight. .. . That success, when many rivals have flailed, has its
roots in a high-pressure sales culture, according to the lawsuit and conversations with
employees.... The employees, all of whom worked at the bank within the last five years,
described having multiple meetings every day to discuss sales quotas and feeling intense
pressure to meet those targets. Khalid Taha, a Wells Fargo personal banker in San Diego
since November 2013, said he has daily and hourly sales goals in his branch in addition to
the quarterly goals set by the company. Depending on the time of year, he said he has
to produce 10 to 20 solutions a day."); see also Reckard, supra note 82 ("Wells Fargo & Co.
branches create a high-pressure sales environment for employees-one in which the
threat of being fired weighs heavily on front-line bankers given quotas for new accounts,
cards and credit lines.").
121. INDEP. DIRS. OF THE BD. OF WELLS FARGO & CO., supra note 84, at 54 (alteration
in original) (quoting John Stumpf e-mail).
122. Thousands of such employees were fired. See Wells Fargo's Pressure-Cooker, supra
note 86; Wells Fargo Fires Workers, supra note 86.
123. See Shaev v. Baker, No. 16-cv-05541-JST, 2017 WL 1735573, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
May 4, 2017) (quoting the Wells 2010 annual report as describing Wells as "the king of
cross-sell"); ELIZABETH WARREN, THIS FIGHT IS OUR FIGHT: THE BATTLE TO SAVE
AMERICA'S MIDDLE CLASS 231-32 (2017) ("Every three months, just like clockwork, John
Stumpf, the CEO of Wells Fargo, got on the phone with the Wall Street players and
talked about the amazing number of new accounts they had opened and modestly
proclaimed his bank's genius at cross-selling. And when he did this, the bank's stock price
went up and up and up, right along with his own bonuses and stock options."); Reckard,
supra note 82 (reporting that Wells "boasts of selling more add-on products to customers
than any other financial institution").
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modest market response, it is difficult to see why a financial institution
would fear a stern response from the market to less egregious behavior
or conduct that did not inspire a penalty from regulators.
C. Is Informal Dispute Resolution a Substitute for Collective Action?
Free-market supporters of arbitration clauses have mounted a
secondary argument. While arbitration defenders have generally not
taken issue with the findings that consumers do not understand
arbitration clauses, 124 two commentators, Professors Johnston and
Zywicki, have argued that whether consumers take arbitration
124. Indeed, one industry trade association seemingly conceded that consumers do not
read arbitration clauses in its comments on the CFPB's proposal to conduct its survey. See
Letter from Bill Himpler, Exec. Vice President, Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n, to Consumer Fin.
Prot. Bureau 2-3 (Aug. 6, 2013), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CFPB-
2013-0016-0011 ("The results of the [proposed CFPB] Survey will undoubtedly show
that the vast majority of consumers are not aware of most of the provisions in their card
agreements .... [S]tudies have shown that consumers do not generally read contracts.
Accordingly, if consumers do not read contracts generally, there is no reason to assume
that they may read an arbitration provision, in particular. . . . [The proposed
CFPB telephone] Survey is likely to show that consumers are not generally aware of
the arbitration provision in their credit card agreement . . . ."); cf. Andrew Pincus,
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, Statement on Examining the
CFPB's Proposed Rulemaking on Arbitration: Is It in the Public Interest and for the
Protection of Consumers app. at 14-15 (May 18, 2016), https://financialservices.house.gov/
uploadedfiles/hhrg-114-bal5-wstate-apincus-20160518.pdf ("The only data that the
Bureau's study delivers is that, unsurprisingly, consumers are not focused on arbitration
clauses . . . ."); Hirschmann & Rickard Letter, supra note 57, at 31. Critics have also
argued that the Bureau's survey
is completely irrelevant to determining whether arbitration offers benefits to
consumers . . . [because t]he Bureau refused to obtain information about
consumers' baseline level of knowledge of other key provisions of their card
agreements. Without that comparative baseline, the Bureau cannot determine
whether consumers pay greater, less, or the same attention to dispute resolution
clauses as to other clauses ....
Id. at 30-31 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 30 n.95 (making the same complaint about
Whimsy Little Contracts). In fact, the statement is partly inaccurate. Both the CFPB
study and the Whimsy Little Contracts study attempted to determine the salience of
arbitration clauses to consumers as compared with other contract terms, and they found
that some other aspects of the contract were more significant to consumers. See CFPB
ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 33, § 3, at 11-15 (noting that respondents considered a
variety of factors in choosing credit, such as interest rate, customer service, rewards,
credit limit, fees, reputation, and card acceptance, ahead of the method of dispute
resolution); Whimsy Little Contracts, supra note 63, at 40-41 (finding that arbitration was
tied for the fourteenth most salient contract term, mentioned by about three percent of
respondents). But to the extent that the critics point out that the studies did not examine
consumer comprehension of other terms, they are correct. See id. at 73 n.229.
Understanding of other contract terms does not bear on whether consumers recognize or
grasp the effect of arbitration clauses.
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provisions into account in making shopping decisions is not pertinent to
the question of whether arbitration clauses should be regulated,
because markets function in such a way as to make it unnecessary for
consumers to understand arbitration clauses. 125 They argue that
because financial institutions are quick to waive disputed fees in the
interest of retaining customer business, the form of dispute resolution is
irrelevant. 126 They further explain:
[W]e were able to examine data provided by a mid-sized
regional bank in Texas with respect to its internal processes for
resolving disputes....
... Overall, the bank offered refunds in about 68% of cases in
which a consumer complained, resulting in refunds of over
$2.275 million in 2014.... Credit card issuers have every
incentive to respond to valid complaints brought by their
cardholders precisely because consumers do what they told the
CFPB they would do: terminate a card when the issuer does not
respond. Given the effectiveness of this market response,
consumers do not need to know anything about the details of the
potential legal response they might have available when a
company declines to refund charges and fees, and they have no
reason to assume that being required to arbitrate rather than
litigate would be an important reason to select one card over
another.127
125. See Jason Scott Johnston & Todd Zywicki, The Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau's Arbitration Study: A Summary and Critique 28-32 (Mercatus Ctr., George
Mason Univ., Working Paper No. LS 15-07, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=2650846. Johnston and Zywicki address only the Bureau's
study, but much of what they say, if it were well-taken, would also apply to Whimsy
Little Contracts, supra note 63; see also Hirschmann & Rickard Letter, supra note 57,
at 28, 31-32.
126. Johnston & Zywicki, supra note 125. They also provide the example, without any
substantiation, of a financial institution that "may have inadvertently placed individual
social security number information in a location on a document where it is visible to third
parties" and that "[i]n such cases, the provider may itself take corrective action, such as
providing free credit monitoring." Id. at 30-31.
127. Id. at 31-32 (emphasis added); see also Jason S. Johnston et al., Mercatus Center
at George Mason University, Comment on Proposed Rule on Arbitration Agreements, 12
CFR Part 1040, at 4-5 (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Mercatus-
Arbitration-PIC-v1.pdf ("The Bureau dismisses evidence that financial firms have a very
strong, market-driven incentive to nternally [sic] resolve consumer claims quickly and
fairly.... The Bureau's data . . . show that consumers prefer the market to the legal
response for perceived service failures by a credit card company. When a company does
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This argument is flawed in no fewer than ten respects. First, it tells
us nothing about whether other banks have made a similar calculation,
or even whether the Texas bank continues the same policy today.
Second, it offers no aid for the 32% of the bank's customers who did not
obtain a refund. Similarly, we cannot be certain that the 68% .of
consumers who received relief obtained the full relief to which they
were entitled. Third, it is impossible to tell from this bare statistic the
reasons for the bank's decision. The bank may base its decision on any
number of considerations other than whether it has acted wrongly-
which would normally be the principal consideration in litigation.128
Instead, the bank could offer a refund because it finds the risk of losing
a particular customer's patronage sufficiently great if it does not, or
deny a refund because it expects the customer to maintain the account
regardless of what the bank does. Or the bank could base its decisions
on whether or not the customer's business is sufficiently remunerative
to justify forgoing the lost fee, 129 or on any other grounds it chooses,
including grounds that are considered odious and discriminatory.
not internally resolve disputes to the customers' satisfaction, they take their credit card
business elsewhere, and they are unlikely to see a need to sue." (footnote omitted)).
Similar arguments have been made about consumer use of social media. See Hirschmann
& Rickard Letter, supra note 57, at 73 ("[C]onsumers can and do use social media to stop
unjustified business conduct, without the need to retain a lawyer or to turn to complex,
lengthy and time-consuming class action procedures."). While consumers aroused by
social media do seem to have had an impact on some business practices, see id. at 73-74,
social media did not stop Wells Fargo's misconduct, nor does it provide a mechanism for
compensating injured consumers.
128. See Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32,830, 32,857 (proposed May 24,
2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1040) ("[Even w]here consumers do make complaints
informally, the outcome of these disputes may be unrelated to the underlying merits of
the claim.").
129. See id. ("[I]f two consumers bring the same dispute to a company, the company
might resolve the dispute in favor of a consumer who is a source of significant profit while
it might reach a different resolution for a less profitable consumer. Indeed, in the
Bureau's experience it is quite common for financial institutions . . . to maintain
profitability scores on each customer and to cabin the discretion of customer service
representatives to make adjustments on behalf of complaining consumers based on such
scores." (footnote omitted)). In a later comment, Johnston and Zywicki, joined by Michael
P. Wilt, responded to the Bureau's statement by suggesting that profitability is an
appropriate basis for deciding whether to grant consumers relief: "In practice, however,
profitability seems to amount to a determination of whether the consumer is a responsible
borrower who has made an inadvertent late payment or an inveterate late payer with a
low average balance who is likely to leave the issuer with a large unpaid and uncollectible
balance." Johnston et al., supra note 127, at 13. But this response seems to miss the
mark, as it is difficult to see what bearing a customer's profitability would have had on
whether Wells should have compensated the customer for injuries caused by opening an
unauthorized account.
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Fourth, it is not clear that any of the waived fees involved bank
misconduct, as in the Wells example. Professors Johnston and Zywicki
later filed a comment on the CFPB's then-proposed regulation, together
with Michael P. Wilt, in which they seemingly focused on the frequency
of bank forgiveness of fees that were in fact due. 130 Similarly, in a
separate report, Professor Johnston referred multiple times to "fee
forgiveness" in connection with the information he and Professor
Zywicki had obtained from the bank.131 There is a difference between a
bank forgiving fees it is entitled to charge, because of customer
behavior, such as an inactivity fee or a late fee, and refunding a fee
because of bank behavior. When, for example, a bank forgives a late fee
at the request of a careless customer, the bank can expect the customer
to feel grateful to the bank, and the customer might accordingly be
more likely to continue banking there. But when a bank, say, opens an
account the customer has not authorized, and later refunds fees charged
on the account, the customer might feel that the bank has done no more
than it should have done and so might feel gratitude is not warranted.
Consequently, the fact that a bank is willing to adopt a strategy of
currying favor with customers by forgoing fees that are due might not
shed any light on what the bank does when the bank is at fault.
Fifth, it is not certain that disappointed consumers will in fact take
their business elsewhere, even when the bank has acted wrongly. Fewer
than sixty percent of the Bureau's survey respondents indicated that
they would cancel their credit card if their credit card issuer charged
them a fee that they had not signed up forl 32-a number not that
different from the percentage of the Texas bank's customers who
130. The comment argued that "[e]ven a brief survey of the online personal-finance
literature indicates that, had the Bureau done more research into market incentives for
financial institutions to grant refunds or fee reversals when consumers complain, it would
have found that such reversals are common." Johnston et al., supra note 127, at 13. In
support of this claim, the authors cite an article reporting on a survey finding that 86% of
customers who have sought reversal of a late payment fee have obtained it. See Kerri
Anne Renzulli, The Crazy Easy Trick to Getting a Credit Card Fee Waived or Your Rate
Lowered, TIME (Sept. 25, 2014), http://time.com/money/3425668/how-to-get-credit-
card-fee-waived-rate-lowered. The comment failed to note, however, that the article
indicated that consumers are more likely to obtain the fee waiver if they are older or
higher-income-again, factors which do not bear on whether the financial institution
engaged in misconduct. Moreover, as the fees in question amounted to twenty-six dollars
or less, the survey offers little guidance for how banks respond when the amounts at issue
are larger, as in the Wells example.
131. See Jason Scott Johnston, Preliminary Report: Class Actions and the Economics of
Internal Dispute Resolution and Financial Fee Forgiveness, MANHATTAN INST. 12 (Aug.
19, 2016), https://www.manhattan-institute.org/sites/default/files/R-JJ-0816-vl.pdf.
132. CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 33, § 3, at 16, 18.
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obtained refunds. 133 The implication is that banks need not fear loss of
patronage from a substantial minority of customers. And of course,
while customers may predict that they will close their accounts during a
telephone survey, when the issue actually arises, they may decide
differently. Moving bank accounts from one institution to another is
also more cumbersome than replacing one credit card with another.
Consumers who have set up direct deposit from employers or for
government benefits, and who have arranged for automatic bill
payments, must repeat that process with a new bank. Consequently,
consumers faced with actually closing bank accounts may find the
inconvenience of doing so causes them to change their plans instead of
their bank. According to a Consumers Union report, "[s]witching bank
accounts takes time, money and substantial attention to detail . . . ."134
That may explain in part why Wells Fargo, within months of its fraud
becoming national news, experienced an increase in its number of
deposits and checking accounts. 135 Indeed, it is not even certain that the
consumer will notice an improperly charged fee or challenge it if the
consumer becomes aware of it. 136
133. See Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 32,857 n.369. The Bureau's finding
was confined to credit card accounts. Id. at 32,843. Consumers may incur greater
switching costs for other financial products, such as checking accounts, see infra note 134
and accompanying text, and so fewer may switch checking account providers.
134. See SUZANNE MARTINDALE ET AL., TRAPPED AT THE BANK: REMOVING OBSTACLES
TO CONSUMER CHOICE IN BANKING 19 (2012), http://consumersunion.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/09/TrappedAtTheBankl.pdf; see also id. at 1 ("We found that indeed it can
be a hassle to move one's money-because, simply put, it takes time and money to move
your money. The process takes several steps and banks don't always make it clear how to
close accounts. Consumers face many obstacles, such as: the transfer of automatic
deposits and debits from the old account to the new account; wait times while automatic
deposit and debit transfers are processed; fees for closing accounts or for certain methods
of receiving or transferring remaining balances; risk of old accounts reopening; and
inadequate information about bank account closing policies." (emphasis omitted)); Haiyan
Shui & Lawrence M. Ausubel, Time Inconsistency in the Credit Card Market 25 (May 3,
2004) (unpublished manuscript) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=586622) (finding
consumers reluctant to switch between credit cards and that the average switching cost is
$150).
135. See supra Figure 1.
136. See, e.g., Arthur Best & Alan R. Andreasen, Consumer Response to Unsatisfactory
Purchases: A Survey of Perceiving Defects, Voicing Complaints, and Obtaining Redress, 11
LAW & SOC. REV. 701, 712 (1977) (finding that only 30.7% of consumers noticing problems
complain); Rex H. Warland et al., Dissatisfied Consumers: Who Gets Upset and Who Takes
Action, 9 J. CONSUMER AFF. 148, 152 (1975) (describing a study finding that about half of
consumers do not complain to sellers or external agencies when dissatisfied).
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Sixth, a waived fee does little for consumers who seek more than
a refund.137 Recall Mr. Brodie, the Wells customer whose credit
score allegedly dropped because of an unauthorized account, and
who consequently was charged higher interest rates on other
loans.138 Reimbursement of fees on an unauthorized account is
hopelessly inadequate redress for such a consumer.
A seventh problem is Johnston and Zywicki's assumption that
financial institutions wish to retain the customer's good will. That is
surely true in many markets, including markets in which Wells
operates, but in others-such as debt collection, mortgage, or student
loan servicing-consumers cannot choose their counterparties, and so
retention of consumer good will is less valuable to businesses. 139 Indeed,
one reason sometimes given for Congress to enact the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") in a form which regulates the
behavior of debt collectors but largely leaves original creditors
unregulated is that external debt collectors are less likely to be
restrained by concerns for consumer good will. 140
An eighth flaw in the argument is that if such private resolution of
problems were completely effective, we would expect that few
consumers would complain to the CFPB's complaint database, or at
least no one who does so would obtain relief, because they would
already have been satisfied by the company, assuming they first
complained to the company, something informed consumers would do if
such complaints reliably produced satisfactory outcomes. Yet the
Bureau reports having received more than 1,100,000 complaints, and in
one recent year, nearly a fifth of complaining consumers obtained some
relief.141 As for Wells Fargo itself and the database, during one recent
year, 2015, the CFPB complaint database posted 9510 consumer
137. See Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 32,857 ("Nothing requires a company
to . . . award complete relief to that consumer. . . .").
138. See Glazer et al., supra note 5 and accompanying text.
139. See Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 32,857 n.367.
140. See Jerry D. Brown, Painting a Mustache on the Mona Lisa-How Tinkering with
the Validation Notice Will Get You Every Time, 53 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 42, 51 (1999)
("[I]n-house collectors (at least theoretically) will use self-control in collecting debts,
because they want repeat business from the consumer."). The FDCPA is codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p (2012).
141. The CFPB report of more than 1,100,000 complaints appears on its website. See
Consumer Complaint Database, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, https://
www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/consumer-complaints (last visited May 3, 2018);
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER RESPONSE ANNUAL REPORT 1, 43 (2016), http:/
/files.consumerfinance.gov/fl201604_cfpbconsumer-response-annual-report-2015.pdf
(finding that 6% of complaining consumers obtained monetary relief and 12% secured
non-monetary relief).
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complaints concerning Wells Fargo. 142 Wells provided monetary relief to
658 of the complaining consumers, though 82 of those remained
sufficiently unsatisfied that they disputed the outcome, perhaps
because they thought the amount provided was not enough. Another
409 received non-monetary relief. Non-monetary relief could include, for
example, changing an entry in a credit report. In any event, 73 of those
complainants disputed the result. The remaining 8443 consumers
received an explanation from Wells but not a remedy, and of those 1952
still registered a dispute. In all, 2107 consumers, or 22% of those who
complained, disputed the result even after complaining to the Bureau.
It is impossible to know how many of the complainants had legitimate
complaints, or what percentage of those were remedied, but plainly the
opportunity to complain to Wells itself, as opposed to the CFPB, did not
obviate the need for the CFPB complaint database. Given that some of
those taking advantage of the Bureau's complaint mechanism were able
to obtain relief by so doing, it appears that the opportunity to voice
concerns to the CFPB provides value-which should not be the case if
Johnston and Zywicki were correct.
Ninth, even assuming that all financial institutions employ a
similar policy and refund fees for all consumers entitled to such a
refund, the argument still proves too much. Taken to its logical
conclusion, Johnston and Zywicki's contention suggests that financial
institutions-and indeed, any business that fears loss of a customer's
patronage-would never violate the law and so should be immune from
suit in any forum. Their theory argues that businesses which depend on
customer good will should always value that good will enough to resolve
disputes in favor of the customer. But that obviously is not true, as the
Wells Fargo example itself demonstrates. Countless other cases do as
well, including class actions. 143 Indeed, since its inception in 2011,
the CFPB has secured nearly $12 billion in relief for more than 29
million consumers. 14 4
142. These figures were calculated by my research assistant, Amanda M. Schaefer,
from the CFPB consumer complaint database.
143. For an example of a class action in which the court imposed liability on a financial
institution for unfair and fraudulent conduct, see Gutierrez v. Wells Fargo Bank, 730 F.
Supp. 2d 1080, 1124-26 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff'd in pertinent part, 704 F.3d 712, 725-28
(9th Cir. 2012). Similarly, the CFPB Arbitration Study summarizes class actions brought
against eleven banks.arising out of overdraft reordering that resulted in settlements with
6,493,837 consumers and payments of $377,430,000. See CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY,
supra note 33, § 8, at 43.
144. See Consumer Complaint Database, supra note 141.
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Tenth, Johnston and Zywicki overlook the deterrent function of
class actions. 145 Financial institutions risking a class action for
misconduct have a significant incentive to refrain from misbehavior. If,
on the other hand, financial institutions know that they can cheat
customers and still retain consumer good will by refunding the fees of
complaining consumers, they have a much-reduced incentive to avoid
misconduct. That seems especially likely to be true when damages are
small enough that few consumers will bother to pursue the matter,
whether in court or arbitration.146 Under Johnston and Zywicki's
system, non-complaining consumers receive no compensation, whereas,
in a class action regime, they will in cases in which money is
automatically credited to class members' accounts, and they may in
other class actions if they complete the requisite forms. As aggrieved
consumers generally do not complain, 14 7 this difference in the amount of
compensation paid can have a significant impact on whether wrong-
doers are deterred.
One possible test of the effectiveness of Johnston and Zywicki's
claim is what happened in the Wells Fargo unauthorized account case
itself: given that millions of such accounts were opened, did consumers
complain in like numbers? Unfortunately, the number of consumers
who complained to Wells is not publicly available. But the CFPB
complaint database may be a partial substitute. It is not a perfect
proxy, not only because consumers may complain to Wells and not to
the Bureau-or vice versa-but also because the Bureau does not make
public all the complaints it receives: the CFPB allows consumers to
choose whether their complaints will be made public, and some prefer
privacy. 148 There is no way to know how many complaints the Bureau
has received about unauthorized Wells accounts that are not public, but
there is also no reason to believe that complainants about such accounts
would choose to conceal their complaints from the public in
disproportionate numbers. In any event, my research assistant,
Amanda M. Schaefer, read the public complaint information filed with
the Bureau in 2015 about Wells Fargo. She found that at most,
nineteen people filed public complaints about unauthorized accounts
opened by Wells Fargo employees. In some cases, it was impossible to
determine whether the account was opened by a Wells Fargo employee,
145. See supra note 113.
146. See supra notes 16-17, 37-40 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
148. Submit a Complaint, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU,
https://complaint.consumerfinance.gov/submit-a-complaint/s/products (follow "Next" but-
ton to step 3) (last visited May 3, 2018).
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an external identity thief, or an employee of a retailer that offered an
affiliated Wells Fargo credit card. But even assuming that all nineteen
were opened by Wells employees-or even assuming that ten times that
number of consumers complained to the Bureau and did not authorize
public disclosure of their complaint-the number of complaints seems
absurdly small for a fraud repeated millions of times. 14 9
While it is not possible to determine why the Bureau received so few
complaints about so widespread a fraud, some speculations are possible.
Conceivably, many consumers complained to Wells, obtained
satisfaction, and saw no need to notify the Bureau. While some
probably did just that, it seems unlikely to be a complete explanation. 150
Other explanations include that consumers did not know about the
unauthorized accounts or did not see them as worth complaining
about.151 In any event, the paucity of complaints to the CFPB database
about Wells Fargo's millions of unauthorized complaints raises red flags
about the effectiveness of relying on complaints as the sole consumer
protection mechanism.
D. More on Consumer Behavior
Another way of understanding Johnston and Zywicki's theory is
that it implies that consumers have made a conscious decision
not to concern themselves with how disputes will be resolved out of a
belief that financial institutions will so value their patronage
that the institution will accede to their requests. Maybe some
consumers-economists, perhaps-indeed go through such a thought
process. But given that many of the respondents in the Whimsy Little
Contract study believed even properly-written arbitration clauses would
not bind them, 152 an explanation that is at least as plausible is that
149. Ms. Schaefer calculated that twenty-six percent of the Wells complaints filed in
2015 are public. See E-mail from Amanda M. Schaefer, Research Assistant, to author
(July 12, 2017) (on file with author). If we assume the number of public complaints
on an issue bears the same proportion to the total complaints on that issue as the
number of public complaints does to total complaints, the Bureau received about
seventy-six possible complaints about Wells employees opening unauthorized accounts.
Again, even if we assume that number understates the number of complaints by a factor
of ten or twenty, it still seems very low for a scam that resulted in at least three million
unauthorized accounts.
150. Of the nineteen complainants, seven objected to Wells Fargo's response; the other
dozen did not, so it is likely that at least the other dozen did not complain first to Wells
and then to the CFPB, as presumably Wells would have responded the same way initially
and they still complained to the Bureau.
151. See supra note 136.
152. See Whimsy Little Contract, supra note 63, at 52-53.
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numerous consumers-wrongly-believe that arbitration clauses
are not enforceable and so are not worth their attention. The
well-known optimism bias-the tendency of consumers to be unduly
optimisticl 53-may also play a role here, in that consumers may think
that nothing in the contract matters.
But these explanations probably presuppose that consumers give
more thought to whether to read contracts than is in fact the case. The
widespread reluctance of consumers to read contracts has been
well-documented. 154 For example, in one study, 543 college students
were offered a chance to sign up for a new social network and were
given the opportunity to read the terms of service and privacy policy.155
Though the terms of service would have taken the typical person
sixteen minutes to read, the average student devoted less than a
minute to it. 156 That may explain why all the students agreed to it, even
153. See David A. Armor & Shelley E. Taylor, When Predictions Fail: The Dilemma of
Unrealistic Optimism, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE
JUDGMENT 334, 334 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter HEURISTICS AND
BIASES] ("One of the most robust findings in the psychology of prediction is that people's
predictions tend to be optimistically biased."); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of
Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1743, 1782 (2000) (stating that contracting
parties tend to be "unrealistically optimistic"); Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics
Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1659 (1998) ("[P]eople are
often unrealistically optimistic about the probability that bad things will happen to them.
A vast number of studies support this conclusion."); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic
Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 806, 806, 818-
19 (1980); see also Dale Griffin & Amos Tversky, The Weighing of Evidence and the
Determinants of Confidence, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra, at 230, 248 ("Although
overconfidence is not universal, it is prevalent, often massive, and difficult to eliminate.");
Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic
Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 453-54, 483 (2002) ("People intending to purchase a product
likely will overstate their own ability to assess the reputation and good faith of the
person or company with whom they are interacting."); Dan N. Stone, Overconfidence in
Initial Self-Efficacy Judgments: Effects on Decision Processes and Performance,
59 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HuM. DECISION PROCESSES 452, 453-54, 468-70 (1994)
(citing studies that demonstrate consumer optimism). For examples of optimistic
behavior, see Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 772-74
(2003) (reviewing HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra) ("With respect to most of the risks of
life, people appear to be unrealistically optimistic.").
154. See, e.g., OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO
KNow: THE FAILURE OF MANDATORY DISCLOSURE 55, 79 (2014); Whimsy Little Contracts,
supra note 63, at 15-17.
155. See Jonathan A. Obar & Anne Oeldorf-Hirsch, The Biggest Lie on the Internet:
Ignoring the Privacy Policies and Terms of Service Policies of Social Networking Services
11-12 (Aug. 24, 2016) (working paper) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=2757465).
156. Id. at 16-17.
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though it obliged them to surrender their first-born child.157 Similarly,
an online company with a whimsical streak ended up the owner of the
souls of 7500 consumers under its contract.158 Nor are ordinary
consumers alone in ignoring such documents. Chief Justice Roberts, 15 9
Judge Richard Posner,16 0 and other legal luminaries 6 1 acknowledge
that they do not read contract terms.
If consumers do not read contracts, a system based on the
assumption that they do can hardly be expected to reach optimal
results. The practice of not reading contracts is so widespread that it is
more plausible to say that reasonable people do not read contracts than
to say that they do. A legal regime that penalizes people for following a
universally observed custom makes little sense. Indeed, it is difficult to
see why people should be penalized for not reading contracts that they
do not understand and do not believe are enforceable.
The attack on free-market economics finds support in the work of
scholars like Nobel Prize winner Richard H. Thaler and Cass R.
Sunstein.162 Thaler and Sunstein have argued that too much economic
theory is based on imaginary people they call "Homo Economicus" or
"Econs": rational people who do not behave as behavioral economics has
157. See id. at 13, 17.
158. See 7,500 Online Shoppers Unknowingly Sold Their Souls, Fox NEWS (Apr.
15, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/techl2010/04/15/online-shoppers-unknowingly-sold-
souls.html; see also Whimsy Little Contracts, supra note 63, at 36 (noting that the average
respondent spent enough time with the credit card contract to read only fourteen percent
of it); Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A License to Deceive: Enforcing
Contractual Myths Despite Consumer Psychological Realities, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 617,
677-82 (2009) (noting that seventeen percent of subjects signed a genuine consent form
without reading, and that the average subject spent sixteen seconds reading, even after
experimenters had subjects sign a phony consent form that required signers to do push-
ups on command and administer electric shocks to other signers, even if they screamed or
asked for medical assistance).
159. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Chief Justice Roberts Admits He Doesn't Read the
Computer Fine Print, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 20, 2010, 12:17 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/
news/article/chief justice-roberts admitshedoesntread the computer fine-print.
160. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Judge Posner Admits He Didn't Read Boilerplate for
Home Equity Loan, A.B.A. J. (June 23, 2010, 1:37 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/
article/judge-posner admitshe.didnt-read-boilerplate-for..home..equityoan.
161. Daniel White, Read Hillary Clinton's Remarks from a Rally in Toledo, Ohio,
TIME (Oct. 3, 2016), http://time.com/4517335/hillary-clinton-transcript-toledo-ohio ("You
know, who reads all that fine print? I don't. And you get defrauded or you get mistreated
and then all the sudden they, well you can't sue us." (quoting presidential candidate
Hillary R. Clinton)).
162. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 97-99 (2009).
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shown actual people do. 163 As Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman has
written:
In a nation of Econs, government should keep out of the way,
allowing the Econs to act as they choose ....
Humans, more than Econs, also need protection from others
who deliberately exploit their weaknesses . . . . An Econ will
read and understand the fine print of a contract before signing
it, but Humans usually do not. An unscrupulous firm that
designs contracts that customers will routinely sign without
reading has considerable legal leeway in hiding important
information in plain sight. 164
Financial institutions like Wells Fargo that use arbitration clauses
that consumers cannot process fit within the description of firms hiding
information in plain sight. 165
I have argued elsewhere that just as economists who strive for
realistic models have moved from assuming that people are Econs to
taking into account predictable irrationalities, lawmakers should
undergo a similar transition from creating rules based on unrealistic
assumptions about human behavior-such as that people ("Homo Lex"
163. See, e.g., DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT
SHAPE OUR DECISIONS 239 (2008); DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW
411-12 (2011); RICHARD H. THALER, MISBEHAVING: THE MAKING OF BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS 4-5 (2015).
164. KAHNEMAN, supra note 163, at 412-13 (2011). Kahneman goes on to suggest that
disclosures in simple text and large print might solve the problem. See id. at 413. But see
Whimsy Little Contracts, supra note 63, at 79 (noting that printing terms in italics, bold,
and partly in ALLCAPS did not improve awareness, indicating that prominent text is not
by itself a solution). In addition, because many consumers believe class action waivers are
unenforceable, even providing such a waiver in simple language would not cure the
problem. See id. at 4.
165. Similarly, Russell Korobkin has argued that businesses have an incentive to
include terms that favor the businesses regardless of whether the terms are efficient
when the terms are not salient to consumers-something that is true of arbitration
clauses. See Korobkin, supra note 56, at 1206 ("Assuming that price is always a salient
product attribute for buyers, market competition actually will force sellers to provide low-
quality non-salient attributes in order to save costs that will be passed along to buyers in
the form of lower prices. Ironically, the consequence of market forces in a world of
boundedly rational buyer decisionmaking is that contracts will often include terms that
are socially inefficient, leave buyers as a class worse off . . . than they would be if their
contracts included only efficient terms, and leave sellers as a class worse off as well.").
Thus, the mere fact that businesses choose to include arbitration clauses in their
contracts does not mean that arbitration clauses are efficient and government regulation
is unnecessary.
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or "lexons") read contracts-to crafting rules that take into account
actual behavior.16 6 In the context of arbitration clauses, such an
approach would do exactly what the CFPB rule would do: substitute for
rules founded in ideology rules based on empirical research into what is
in consumers' best interest when such research demonstrates that
consumers do not understand arbitration clauses well enough to protect
themselves. Doing anything else runs the risk of not sufficiently
incentivizing the Wells Fargos of this world to resist the temptation to
take advantage of consumers.
E. Returning to the Broader Context: Mechanisms to Restrain Business
Misconduct
Of the four mechanisms that could restrain companies from
misconduct, two-self-restraint and the market-were ineffective when
it came to Wells, and in fact, the free market might have exacerbated
the problem. The third-lawsuits from injured consumers-was largely
disabled by the Wells arbitration clause. Only the fourth-
governmental intervention-was effective.
Is government action sufficient, as some arbitration advocates have
argued? 167 The Bureau Study found that "public enforcement is not
itself a sufficient means to enforce consumer protection laws." 168 In any
event, the same members of Congress that seek to block the Bureau
from banning class action waivers in consumer financial contracts are
also seeking to limit or even eliminate the CFPB. 169 Indeed, House
Financial Services Chair Jeb Hensarling's proposed Financial
CHOICE Act would abolish the authority the CFPB used to force Wells
to agree to the consent order concerning unauthorized accounts.1 7 0 If
166. See Jeff Sovern & Kate E. Walton, Are Validation Notices Valid? An Empirical
Evaluation of Consumer Understanding of Debt Collection Validation Notices, 70 SMU L.
REV. 63, 120 (2017).
167. Feddis, Zeisel & Foster Letter, supra note 57, at 16-18; Hirschmann & Rickard
Letter, supra note 57, at 4-5.
168. Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32,830, 32,860 (proposed May 24, 2016)
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1040). See generally CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra
note 33, § 9.
169. See, e.g., S. 370, 115th Cong. (2017) (bill that would eliminate CFPB); Jeff Sovern,
Ratcliffe/Cruz Bill Would Eliminate the CFPB, PUB. CITIZEN: CONSUMER L. & POL'Y BLOG
(Feb. 15, 2017, 12:44 PM), http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2017/02/ratcliffecruz-bill-
would-eliminate-the-cfpb.html.
170. The Bureau used its powers to prevent financial institutions from engaging in
unfair or abusive practices under 12 U.S.C. § 5531 (2012) to restrain Wells. See Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0015 (Sept. 4, 2016), 2016 WL 6646128,
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/092016_cfpb_WFBconsentorder.pdf. House
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the free-marketers succeed, consumers who wish to avoid being
defrauded will be forced to depend on market sanctions or financial
institutions' consciences-both of which proved inadequate as to Wells
until regulators intervened.1 71 In such a scenario, it is not clear what
would discourage financial institutions from maximizing earnings by
engaging in misconduct that injures many individuals only slightly.
Possibly even worse is that companies that increase shareholder
returns in such a fashion might drive more scrupulous companies with
lower returns out of the marketplace.
Bill 10 would repeal those powers. Financial CHOICE Act, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. § 736
(2017). Two other regulators joined the CFPB in its action against Wells: the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") and the Los Angeles City Attorney, though the fines
they levied against Wells were smaller even when combined than the Bureau's fine.
Presumably, neither of those offices would be affected by the Financial CHOICE Act, and
so they could still have proceeded against Wells even if the Bureau could not have. But
relegating enforcement to the OCC raises concerns about how effective it would be at
protecting consumers. While the CFPB was established, as its name implies, solely to
protect consumers, the OCC has a broader set of goals. Compare 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a)
(2012) ("The Bureau shall seek to implement and, where applicable, enforce Federal
consumer financial law consistently for the purpose of ensuring that all consumers have
access to markets for consumer financial products and services and that markets for
consumer financial products and services are fair, transparent, and competitive."), with
About the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), OFF. COMPTROLLER CURRENCY,
https://www.occ.gov/annual-report/about-the-occ/index-about-the-occ.html (last visited
May 3, 2018) ("The mission of the OCC is to ensure that the federal banking system ...
operates in a safe and sound manner, provides fair access to financial services, treats
customers fairly, and complies with applicable laws and regulations."). Moreover, the
OCC has a history of being captured by banks, and if that had been the case during the
Wells Fargo investigation, it is conceivable that the OCC would have been less aggressive.
For example, during the George W. Bush administration, the OCC was led by a former
bank lawyer and lobbyist, John Dugan. During that administration, much of which
coincided with the period in which subprime lenders were making predatory loans that
contributed to the subprime lending crisis that in turn led to the Great Recession, the
OCC proclaimed that state anti-predatory lending laws were preempted as to national
banks. 12 C.F.R. § 34.4 (2017). The OCC also sued to prevent state attorneys general from
enforcing fair lending laws as to national banks. See Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, 557
U.S. 519 (2009). In the actual Wells Fargo example, an internal OCC review found that
the "OCC did not take timely and effective supervisory actions after the bank and the
OCC identified significant issues . . .. " OCC, ENTERPRISE GOVERNANCE SUPERVISION,
supra note 85, at 4. Though the OCC was aware of the problems as early as 2010, it
appears it did not pursue them, beyond conducting meetings in 2010, until years later.
See id. at 5. While states could still act, and the Los Angeles City Attorney was the first
governmental entity to sue Wells over the unauthorized accounts, individual states face
jurisdictional limits that limit their effectiveness as nationwide regulators.
171. Perhaps the best-known recent example of the failure of financial institutions'
consciences can be found in the subprime lending that led to the Great Recession.
See generally Jeff Sovern, Preventing Future Economic Crises Through Consumer
Protection Law or How the Truth in Lending Act Failed the Subprime Borrowers, 71 OHIO
ST. L.J. 761, 803-07 (2010).
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CONCLUSION
Free-market advocates claim that the free market produces ideal
outcomes for consumers, thus obviating the need for government
regulation. Yet when it came to the Wells Fargo phony account
fiasco, which surely ranks among the most significant recent bank
scandals, the free market failed in multiple respects. First, it failed
to discipline Wells. Indeed, the number of active checking accounts
increased during the period that the Wells fraud drew public attention,
suggesting that at least some consumers were not dissuaded from
banking at Wells by its misconduct.
Second, the free market may have facilitated the Wells fraud by
enabling Wells to avoid class action litigation over the fraud, if it
wished to. Had Wells faced the risk of a class action, it might have
taken steps earlier to end its fraud, for fear of incurring excessive
liability for its misbehavior. But Wells inserted in its contracts an
arbitration clause barring class actions, eliminating the possibility that
a class action would have deterred its misconduct. The Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau's rule would have eliminated such class
action waivers in future arbitration clauses, but Congress has blocked
the regulation from taking effect.
Legislators who wear the mantle of the free market may be doing
free-market economics an injustice by employing it when its underlying
assumptions do not hold true. Free-market theory assumes that
consumers understand their contracts, but studies show that consumers
do not comprehend arbitration clauses or class action waivers. If
consumers do not understand such terms, it is unreasonable to expect
them to realize that the contracts they sign strip them of their right to
bring a class action against a bank that opens accounts for the
consumers without their knowledge or consent. In short, a class action
waiver, as envisioned by the CFPB, might well have brought an early
end to the Wells scandal and saved consumers a great deal of pain.
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